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DSCA 04-11

Memo Status : Active Notes : Checklist portion superseded by DSCA Policy Memo 05-1
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DEFENSE SECURITY COOPERATION AGENCY
201 12th STREET SOUTH, STE 203
ARLINGTON, VA 22202-5408

4/2/2004

MEMORANDUM FOR :

SEE DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT :

Golden Sentry End-Use Monitoring (EUM) Visit Policy (DSCA Policy Memorandum 04-11) [SAMM E-Change 6]

DSCA Policy Memorandum 02-43, 4 December 2002, delineated DoD responsibilities in support of the Golden Sentry End-Use Monitoring (EUM) program. This policy was incorporated into Chapter 8 of the Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM). In country visits to assess and evaluate EUM compliance programs are an important part of the Golden Sentry program. Since publication of this policy, the security cooperation community has requested clearer guidance on the execution of these visits. The purpose of this memorandum is to clearly identify the types of visits that might be conducted as part of the Golden Sentry program and the requirements and timelines for the execution of each type of visit.

There are three types of visits that comprise the Golden Sentry EUM program: (1) EUM Familiarization Visit, (2) EUM Tiger Team Visit, and (3) EUM Investigation Visit. Attachments 1-3 provide the requirements and notional timelines for each of these visits. Some of these visits include actual physical checks of articles/services. Attachment 4 provides a checklist used to review requirements for Stinger Missiles. Additional checklists, containing similar information, are being developed for all Enhanced EUM articles/services and will be provided in subsequent policy memoranda for future incorporation into the SAMM.

After each visit, DSCA and other team members are required to publish after action reviews and reports as indicated on Attachments 1-3. Attachment 5 is a sample format for an after action report.

This policy is the product of lessons-learned from conducting EUM Tiger Team Visits to Japan and Egypt and Familiarization Visits to several of the Unified Combatant Commands. We recognize that BUM visits may have a significant impact on the relationship of the host nation and the U.S. country team. Therefore: it is critical that every effort be made to (1) demonstrate respect for the host nation's sovereignty through proper and timely coordination by USG representatives, and (2) keep each EUM visit as short and non-intrusive as possible to achieve the mission.

Effective immediately, the SAMM, located on the DSCA web site, is updated to incorporate this information in Chapter 8, new paragraph C8.2.4. If you have any questions regarding these changes, my point of contact is Mr. Leon N. Yates at (Voice) 703-601-3865

(DSN 329), (FAX) 703-604-6547 (DSN 664), NIPRNET (unclassified) email address Leon.Yates@dsca.mil , and SIPRNET (classified) e-mail addressLeon.Yates@dsca.osd.smil.mil.

Tome H. Walters, Jr.
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director

ATTACHMENT :

  1. EUM Familiarization Visit Guidance
  2. EUM Tiger Team Visit Guidance
  3. EUM Investigation Visit Guidance
  4. DSCA Enhanced End-Use Monitoring Checklists for Stinger Missiles
  5. EUM Visit After Action Report Format

 

DISTRIBUTION :

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
OR DEFENSE EXPORTS AND COOPERATION
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

DIRECTOR, NAVY INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS OFFICE
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
(INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS)
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

CHAIRMAN, JOINT STAFF

COMMANDER, CENTRAL COMMAND

COMMANDER, EUROPEAN COMMAND

COMMANDER, NORTHERN COMMAND

COMMANDER, PACIFIC COMMAND

COMMANDER, SOUTHERN COMMAND

DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DIRECTOR, DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY

DIRECTOR, NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DIRECTOR, DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY
(ATTN: ON-SITE INSPECTION AGENCY)

DIRECTOR, DEFENSE REUTILIZATION AND MARKETING SERVICE

DIRECTOR, DEFENSE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT

AGENCY DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEMS AGENCY

DIRECTOR, DEFENSE LOGISTICS INFORMATION SERVICE

DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR INFORMATION ASSURANCE,
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR SECURITY ASSISTANCE,
DEFENSE FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING SERVICE - DENVER CENTER

CC :

STATE/PM-RSAT
DISAM

Attachment 1

EUM Familiarization Visit Guidance

The purpose of an EUM Familiarization Visit is to assist the host nation, the Security Assistance Organization (SAO) (or equivalent organization/office), and the Unified Command with the development of effective End Use Monitoring (EUM) compliance plans. It provides an opportunity for the DSCA EUM representative to determine what will be necessary to plan and conduct a future EUM Tiger Team Visit in that country should a Tiger Team Visit be required. A Familiarization Visit may be prompted by several different events. Some examples include: The host nation or SAO may request a Familiarization Visit to help them develop their EUM compliance plan; DSCA may determine a Familiarization Visit is needed based on the introduction of specific types of equipment into the region/country; The Unified Command may request a Familiarization Visit to validate EUM programs within their theater; DSCA may determine a Familiarization Visit is needed to ensure an upcoming Tiger Team Visit is on-track; etc. While a Familiarization Visit may oftentimes precede a Tiger Team Visit, it is not necessary to conduct a Familiarization Visit before conducting a Tiger Team Visit.

Each EUM Familiarization Visit will be unique to the country and equipment being assessed. For planning purposes, below is the recommended timeline and formal action requirements for EUM Familiarization Visits. While informal correspondence will likely occur prior to these actions, these "formal" requirements will ensure the processes are well coordinated and documented.

EUM Familiarization Visit Requirements and Timeline

Event No. Timeframe Description

1

Not later than 30 days prior to visit

DSCA/Policy, Plans, and Programs Directorate transmit a Country/Theater Clearance Message in accordance with Foreign Travel Guidance. This message is coordinated with the DSCA Regional Director and identifies major topics to be discussed.

2

Upon receipt of Country/Theater clearance message (Event #1)

SAO acknowledges confirmation for the Familiarization Visit and identifies points of contact (POC) for each subject to be discussed.

SAO ascertains if the visit will be limited to U.S. members only or if host nation participation is warranted.

3

15 days prior to visit

SAO finalizes itinerary with DSCA/Policy, Plans and Programs Directorate and, if applicable, the host nation.

SAO finalizes requirements for the visit, confirms entry information for each site to be visited, and assures that affected unit commanders have received the required authorization and understand the nature and purpose of the visit.

4

Familiarization Visit

SAO ensures someone is at the airport to assist the EUM Familiarization Visit participants when requested by the team.

An SAO representative meets with visit participants upon arrival at the hotel and/or duty location, if required.

Each Familiarization Visit must include the following:

  1. Meeting with EUM Familiarization Visit Team members and the U.S. country team

  2. Meeting with EUM Familiarization Visit Team members and the host nation (if applicable)

  3. Update of Golden Sentry Program by DSCA

  4. Discussions regarding type and quantity of enhanced EUM articles transferred to the host nation

  5. Discussions regarding SAO and host nation's current compliance with EUM requirements

  6. Discussions regarding development of a compliance plan commensurate with the SAO's unique manning

  7. Discussions regarding possibility for a future Tiger Team Visit

  8. Site visits if required

  9. Out-briefing for US country team and host nation as appropriate

While the Familiarization Visit is not intended for accomplishing physical inventories or compliance verification, the EUM Familiarization Visit Team may observe problems during the visit that must be addressed immediately. If during the Familiarization Visit evidence of a possible AECA Section 3 or FAA Section 505 violation is uncovered, see Event #5. If the Familiarization Visit does not uncover any evidence of an AECA Section 3 or FAA Section 505 violation, see Event #6.

5

Immediately upon discovery of a potential AECA Section 3 or FAA Section 505 violation

The EUM Familiarization Team notifies the SAO and country-team with details about the potential violation.

The EUM Familiarization Team notifies the Director, Policy, Plans, and Programs Directorate with details about the potential violation and SAO/country-team response.

If there is a possible violation, the Policy, Plans, and Programs Director, in coordination with the appropriate Regional Director and the U.S. Department of State, will prepare talking points to be used by the country-team to :

  1. notify the host nation of the possible violation and

  2. request that the host nation respond to the issue within 30 days.

If the host nation's response and subsequent assessments confirm the potential violation, DSCA formally forwards information regarding the potential violation to the U.S. Department of State for appropriate action.

6

No later than 15 days after return to CONUS

DSCA EUM lead provides back brief to DSCA/Policy, Plans and Programs and Regional Directorates.

DSCA EUM lead prepares an after action report for distribution to DSCA, the SAO, and the Unified Command.

Attachment 2

EUM Tiger Team Visit Guidance

The purpose of an EUM Tiger Team Visit is to review and evaluate the Security Assistance Organization (SAO) (or equivalent organization/office) and host nation's overall EUM compliance program. The EUM Tiger Team will assess a country's compliance with specific physical security and accountability agreements, provisos, and other terms of sale. Activities during an EUM Tiger Team Visit may include facility visits, record reviews, review of local security policies and procedures, routine or special inventories of U.S. origin defense articles and/or services, etc. EUM Tiger Team Visits require advance planning. The purpose is not to surprise the Unified Command, SAO, or the host nation---the visit should be coordinated well in advance to ensure the EUM Tiger Team is able to successfully conduct its review. When possible, EUM Tiger Team Visits should be scheduled to coincide with a host nation's requisite scheduled inventory or other planned events related to the defense articles or services to be assessed.

Each EUM Tiger Team Visit will be unique to the country and equipment being reviewed. For planning purposes, below is the recommended timeline and formal action requirements for EUM Tiger Team Visits. While informal correspondence will likely occur prior to these actions, these "formal" requirements will ensure the processes are well coordinated and documented.

Event No. Timeframe Description

1

180 days prior to the visit

DSCA/Policy, Plans, and Programs Directorate transmits an EUM Advisory to the SAO and their respective Unified Combatant Commands to notify them of an impending EUM Tiger Team visit with possible EUM items of interest. This message is coordinated with the appropriate DSCA Regional Director or Acting Director.

2

Upon receipt of the Advisory (see Event #1)

SAO notifies U.S. country team and the Host Nation of the impending EUM Tiger Team Visit.

SAO confirms receipt of the advisory message and provides DSCA/Policy, Plans, and Programs Directorate a tentative listing of Enhanced EUM items to be reviewed by the Tiger Team.

3

90 days prior to the visit

DSCA/Policy, Plans, and Programs Directorate, in coordination with the DSCA Regional Directorate, recommends to the SAO the list of defense articles/services to be evaluated by the upcoming EUM Tiger Team Visit.

4

70-89 days prior to visit

In accordance with the Security Assistance Management Manual, Chapter 8, the SAO should be aware of all Letters of Offer and Acceptance (LOAs) for assigned countries and any special security or accountability notes included in those documents. Based on the recommended list of items provided by DSCA, the SAO will review these LOAs and/or other appropriate transfer documents for unique physical security and accountability notes or special provisos.

If the SAO requires additional information regarding serial numbers, LOAs, etc., they should contact the Military Departments for assistance at this time.

SAO determines the location of the articles within the host nation.

SAO develops a tentative itinerary for the upcoming visit.

5

70 days prior to visit

SAO provides feedback to DSCA/Policy, Plans, and Programs Directorate on the following:

  1. Any U.S. country-team concerns.

  2. The SAO representative on the Tiger Team.

  3. Unified Command Tiger Team members (if desired by the Unified Command).

  4. Recommended additions/deletions from the proposed list of items to be evaluated during the visit.

  5. Draft itinerary based on the locations of the items within the host nation.

  6. The SAO's last inventory list(s) for the item(s) to be reviewed complete with serial numbers.

6

60 days prior to visit

DSCA/Policy, Plans, and Programs Directorate issues an Announcement message that:

  1. Identifies the Tiger Team members.

  2. Confirms the list of defense articles and/or services that will be evaluated during the Tiger Team Visit and their physical location(s).

  3. Provides the commodity checklist for each item to be assessed (Example - See Attachment 4 for Enhanced EUM article checklist for Stinger missiles).

7

Not later than 30 days prior to visit

DSCA/Policy, Plans, and Programs Directorate transmits a Country/Theater Clearance Message in accordance with Foreign Travel Guidance. This message is coordinated with the DSCA Regional Directorate and will cover any in-country support requirements (e.g., transportation). Any changes to information provided in the Announcement message are identified in the Country/Theater Clearance Message.

8

Upon receipt of Country/Theater Clearance Message (Event #7)

SAO acknowledges receipt of the message and identifies points of contact (POC) for each area to be evaluated (to include names, phone numbers and email addresses).

SAO conducts final coordination with host nation for site clearance for EUM Tiger Team members.

SAO confirms host nation's preparation for the EUM Tiger Team Visit.

9

15 days prior to visit

SAO finalizes itinerary with DSCA/Policy, Plans and Programs Directorate and the host nation.

SAO finalizes requirements for the visit with the host nation to:

  1. Confirm entry information for each site to be visited.

  2. Ensure that affected unit commanders have received the required authorization.

  3. Ensure everyone understands the standards of the evaluation (e.g., 100% serial number inventory with containers open; 5% random open containers with remainder container serial number verification; etc.).

10

Tiger Team Visit

SAO ensures someone is at the airport to assist the EUM Tiger Team participants when requested by the team.

An SAO representative meets with visit participants upon arrival at the hotel and/or duty location, if required.

Each Tiger Team Visit must include the following:

  1. Meeting with EUM Tiger Team members and the U.S. country team.

  2. Meeting with EUM Tiger Team members and the host nation.

  3. Update of Golden Sentry Program by DSCA.

  4. Evaluate SAO and host nation's current compliance with EUM requirements.

  5. Review the records for the specific items identified in the Announcement message (Event #6).

  6. Conduct site visits to evaluate facility physical security and accountability procedures for the locations identified in the Announcement message (Event #6)

  7. Out-briefings for US country team and host nation. Preliminary observations and findings will be discussed.

If the EUM Tiger Team is unable to complete the visit for any reason, see Event #11.

If during the Tiger Team Visit evidence of a possible AECA Section 3 or FAA Section 505 violation is uncovered, see Event #12.

If the EUM Tiger Team Visit does not uncover any evidence of an AECA Section 3 or FAA Section 505 violation and is able to be completed, see Event #13.

11

Immediately upon identification of problems

The DSCA EUM Tiger Team lead notifies the SAO and country-team with details about why they are unable to successfully complete the visit.

The DSCA EUM Tiger Team lead notifies the Director, Policy, Plans, and Programs Directorate with details about the problem precluding a successful visit, and SAO/country team response.

The Policy, Plans and Programs Director, in coordination with the appropriate Regional Director, will determine appropriate course of action and notify the EUM Tiger Team lead during the visit.

After return to CONUS, the EUM Tiger Team lead will work with the Regional Directorate to develop a follow-up course of action as required.

12

Immediately upon discovery of a potential AECA Section 3 or FAA Section 505 violation

The EUM Tiger Team notifies the SAO and country-team with details about the potential violation.

The EUM Tiger Team notifies the Director, Policy, Plans, and Programs Directorate with details about the potential violation and SAO/country-team response.

If there is a possible violation, the Policy, Plans, and Programs Director, in coordination with the appropriate Regional Director and the U.S. Department of State, will prepare talking points to be used by the country-team to:

  1. notify the host nation of the possible violation and

  2. request that the host nation respond to the issue within 30 days.

If the host nation's response and subsequent assessments confirm the potential violation, DSCA formally forwards information regarding the potential violation to the U.S. Department of State for appropriate action.

13

No later than 15 days after the visit

DSCA EUM Tiger Team lead provides back brief to DSCA/Policy, Plans and Programs and Regional Directorates.

DSCA EUM Tiger Team lead prepares Interim Team After-Action Report (TAR) and distributes to DSCA, the SAO, and the other EUM Tiger Team members for coordination and comment. (See attachment 5 for TAR format.)

14

Upon receipt of Interim TAR (no later than 20 days after the visit)

SAO reviews Interim TAR and provides input to the DSCA EUM Tiger Team lead.

EUM Tiger Team members review Interim TAR and provide input to the DSCA Tiger Team lead.

15

Upon receipt of comments (no later than 25 days after the visit)

DSCA EUM Tiger Team lead prepares Final TAR.

Final TAR is approved by the Director, DSCA and sent to the Commander of the appropriate Unified Combatant Command.

Attachment 3

EUM Investigation Visit Guidance

The purpose of an EUM Investigation Visit is to investigate possible violations of the Arms Export Control Act, Section 3 and the Foreign Assistance Act, Section 505. These visits may be prompted by intelligence reports and/or other sources that indicate a host nation may be using U.S.-origin defense articles and services in ways that do not comply with U.S. laws and policies. EUM Investigation Visits will be conducted as expeditiously as possible within the required coordination for foreign travel from the United States. Because of the unique nature and political sensitivity associated with this type of visit, each EUM Investigation Visit will be handled on a case-by-case basis in concert with the Department of State.

Attachment 4

DSCA Enhanced End-Use Monitoring Checklist - DRAFT

CHECKLIST AND GENERAL GUIDANCE FOR
STINGER MISSILE/MANPADS
END-USE MONITORING COMPLIANCE

PHYSICAL SECURITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY COMPLIANCE FOR STINGER MISSILES/MANPADS TRANSFERS

REFERENCE :

 

  1. DoD 5105.38-M "Security Assistance Management Manual"
  2. DoD 5100.76-M "Physical Security of Sensitive Conventional Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives"
  3. DoD 4140.1-R "DoD Material Management Regulation"
  4. AR 190-11 "Physical Security of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives"
  5. Letter of Offer and Acceptance and other implementing agreements, e.g., MOU/MOA which allow the transfer of MANPADS

 

STINGER MISSILES:

 

  1. SECURITY: Since this is a CAT 1-missile/explosive, it must be secured and inventoried IAW the references.

    1. DEPOT, POST, INSTALLATION STORAGE - General requirements:

    2. UNIT STORAGE - Unit storage is for those missiles, which are stored in a tactical or operational environment. Storage requirements are much the same as for missiles stored in a depot, but commanders may post a letter in the storage facility that indicates they have chosen for operational reasons to store the missiles in an alternate security location. When this happens the minimum security requirements apply:

      1. Missile containers/boxes will be banded together in a manner that easily shows signs of tampering.

      2. Stored in an approved container such as a SEAVAN, MILVAN, or stored in a totally enclosed building.

      3. Doors must be secured with two padlocks (medium or low security padlocks.)

      4. Two-person access rule must be maintained.

      5. Must have 24 hrs armed guard surveillance and the guard must have communications. (When these types of storage facilities are used, IDS or closed circuit TV cannot be a substitute for the 24hr armed guard surveillance.)

      6. NOTE: MANPADS missiles cannot be left in vehicles, aircraft, or ammo holding areas.

    3. WAIVERS/EXCEPTIONS/COMPENSATORY MEASURES: When compliance is not met, ask for any approved waivers or exceptions and the compensatory measures that are used/in effect.

  2. MISSILE INSPECTION:

    1. The missile could be in a metal container or wooden wire bound box common to a lot of ammo. The box will have the serial number on the outside.

    2. Except for missiles deployed to hostile areas, the SAO physically inventories 100 percent of in-country Stinger missiles, grip stocks, and other essential components annually. The inventory must include review of the recipient's records of monthly two-man verifications as required by the Stinger/MANPADS LOA or other arms transfer document note. Unless problems indicate the necessity for such action, the manufacture's sealed missile and weapon round containers should not be opened during the inventory. There must be a manufacture's seal on any one of the latches (metal box) or any one of the bent wire closures (wooden box). Look inside for signs of tampering and verification of missile serial number.

      NOTE: The easiest way for anyone to tamper with a missile and the seal remain untouched is to cut the bounding wire on the bottom, remove the missile and return the missile packing to the wooden crate, and put the crate on the middle of a stack with the cut wire down. A way to tell if the missile has been removed, see next.

    3. SIGNS TO LOOK FOR TO SEE IF A MISSILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM A BOX AND THE BOX RETURNED TO A PALLET. Although not fool proof, the following are things to look for:

      1. Lightweight boxes.

      2. Look at the ends of either metal or wooden boxes. Each will have a window that should show a humidity indicator. If the indicator is missing or cannot be seen or if the indicator shows an unacceptable level of humidity (pink shades of color indicates level of humidity), it is an indication that the missile is missing or that the packaging and desiccant is unserviceable and must be opened and repackaged and desiccant replaced anyway.

      3. Broken seals. Seals are easily broken accidentally. If the seal is broken, open the canister to inventory the missile. If in a wood wire bound box, remove the inner plastic sealed cardboard box from the wooden box and check for cuts or unusual sealing techniques in the sealed wrapping. If all feels and looks original and normal, assume the missile is inside and replace in the wire bound box and reseal. If it looks questionable or its weight is light, the plastic must be removed and the missile physically inventoried.

 

Note the LOA requires 2 high security padlocks, but U.S. regulations require one with a second low to medium security padlock in lieu of a second high security padlock. Make note of which method the host nation is using.

INVENTORY AND COMPLIANCE CHECKLIST FOR MANPADS ON HAND OVER 12 MONTHS.

  1. Does the SAO have a copy of the LOA which contracted the sale of the Stinger Missiles and MANPADS components?

  2. Does the SAO have a copy of all the serial numbers and model numbers for Stinger missiles and grip stocks sold to the host country? If not what actions has the SAO taken to obtain the list?

  3. Has the SAO read and understand the security requirements as indicated in the LOA for the Stinger missiles and grip stocks? If understanding is not complete, what actions has the SAO taken to resolve any questions?

  4. Has an inventory of all serial numbers of Stinger missiles and grip stocks been conducted within the last 12 months by matching the serial numbers on the known list with the serial numbers on the MANPAD component or from the outside of its sealed container? If not what are the reasons?

  5. Were all serial numbers accounted for? If not was a report of the loss provided by the SAO/host nation (as appropriate) and forwarded to the Army and DSCA?

  6. Were there indications of intrusion to the box/container or compromise of the items? A. Wire lead/aluminum seal broken on the container or box B. Humidity indicator a light, medium or dark pink C. Lighter than normal weight of boxes/containers D. Lack of serial numbers on the outside of the box

  7. Was the container opened and the physical serial number presence of the MANPADS components verified if any of the indictors of intrusion or compromise to the container found?

  8. Did the SAO, review the recipient government's records of monthly, quarterly, and/or semi-annual two-man verifications? If they were not available what was the reason?

  9. Does the SAO have a copy of the last serial number inventory on file?

  10. What were the actions taken to correct discrepancies noted in the last inventory and last observations of physical security deficiencies?

FOR MANPADS OR COMPONENTS ARRIVED WITHIN THE PAST 12 MONTHS ADD THE FOLLOWING:

  1. Did the US Army notify the SAO when delivery of the missiles began?

  2. Were serial numbers provided to the SAO for missiles and grip stocks, shipped to and received by the foreign government?

  3. Did the SAO conduct the first physical inventory within 30 days after the US Army notified the SAO of final delivery of missiles? If not explain.

COMPLIANCE INSPECTION OF THE SECURITY FACILITIES AND ARRANGEMENTS USED FOR THE MANPADS
MISSILE SECURITY COMPLIANCE CHECKLIST

Were the following security requirements taken from the LOA complied with?

  1. Guards - Is there a full time guard force?

  2. Fencing - Chain link fence 6ft high with a 1 foot slanted barbed wire overhang at the top. Real estate permitting, 12ft free zone outside the fence & 30 ft inside.

  3. Is lighting provided to illuminate the magazine/arms room/vault door during the hours of darkness or reduced visibility? Is lighting provided along the

  4. Building/magazine - The requirement is for a reinforced concrete, arch type, earth covered magazine. Storage in other types of structures may be permitted if the structure used would provide the same time delay equivalent as the earth covered magazine or igloo.

  5. Door of Class V steel vault specifications - Steel used on these doors is approximately twice the thickness of a good steel wall locker. It should be of double wall construction with reinforcing in between. If should not be easy to open with an axe of other such cutting tool.

  6. Shrouded Hasps used for the high-security padlocks - Hasps which have a heavy metal cover over and around the top of the hasp which when in place prevents easy access to the cutting of the pad lock's shank.

  7. 2 High-security Pad Locks must be used that are operated by key.

  8. 2 person Key Control - Are two persons required to open the door and are they continuously present? Lock & key procedures need to be in place to insure no single person can obtain access to the storage site.

    EXAMPLE OF QUESTIONS TO ASK TO DETERMINE IF A GOOD LOCK & KEY PROCEDURE IS IN PLACE:
    Is a key/lock inventory list being maintained which depicts a list of all keys/locks, key/lock serial numbers, and the number of keys maintained for each lock?
    Do all keys have a serial number stamped or inscribed on them?
    Are master keyed or multiple keyed systems used (not allowed?)?
    Is the key depository located in a room where it is kept under 24-hour surveillance around-the-clock or in a room that can be (and is) locked during non-duty hours?
    Is each person of the two person team necessary to open the doors kept on separate rosters and allowed to have access to only one each of the two keys necessary to open the door (secured by two different hi-security pad locks)?

  9. Seals on containers/boxes intact?

  10. Is the intrusion detection system (IDS) or closed circuit television operational, or is the magazine/arms room/vault under 24-hour surveillance by a guard?

  11. Were compensatory measures used or considered when full compliance with the LOA security measures not met? If so what were the compensatory measures?

  12. If all security requirements are not to standard has a request for exception/waiver regarding structural or security deficiencies been submitted if required? If a waiver/exception has been granted, is it available and reviewed as required, and is the unit complying with any required compensatory measures?

Make a special note for Army if any structure other than an earth covered magazine or igloo is used. Beyond the security issue of using other structures, there could be an explosive safety issue.

GRIP STOCK SECURITY COMPLIANCE CHECKLIST

Note the grip stock is a Category III weapon. Security requirements are not spelled out in the LOA but customer nations are required to meet the Army's minimum-security requirements.

  1. Are grip stocks stored in an enclosed room, with a metal door or metal covered solid wood door, and two padlocks? Door hinges on the inside? Windows barred? Is there security lighting over the door?

  2. Is there controlled access to the keys and entry to the storage facility?

  3. Are the grips stocks secured in a metal secondary container inside the room? If the container with grip stocks inside weighs less than 500lbs is it secured to the floor or walls with chain and locks?

MANDATORY NOTES

 

Note Usage

Mandatory for LOAs for sales of MANPADS to NATO, NATO Nations, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand.

Note Text

"Purchaser agrees to adhere to the following additional security requirements associated with [insert appropriate missile/system]. The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DAMO-ODL-S), U.S. Army may approve modification of specified requirements to meet indigenous conditions.

  1. Physical Security. The [insert appropriate missile] will be stored in magazines that are at least equivalent in strength to U.S. Army requirements as specified in subparagraph (1) below. The purchaser also agrees to comply with U.S. Army specified requirements for lighting, doors, locks, keys, fencing, and surveillance and guard systems. Specific requirements will be agreed upon and installed prior to delivery of the missile system. U.S. Army representatives will be allowed to verify security measures and procedures established for implementation of these requirements.

    1. Magazines. Reinforced concrete, arch type, earth covered whose construction is at least equivalent in strength to the requirements of Chapter 5, DoD 6055.9-STD, "Ammunition and Explosive Safety Standards," July 1984, will be used for storage (standards of which will be provided to the purchaser).

    2. Lighting. Lighting will be provided for exterior doors and along perimeter barriers. Security lighting requirements will conform to the ammunition and safety requirements of U.S. Army Technical Manual 9-1300-206, Appendix C (standards of which will be provided to the purchaser).

    3. Doors, Locks, and Keys. Exterior doors will be class five steel vault doors secured by two key-operated high security padlocks and a high security shrouded hasp. Keys will be secured separately to ensure effective two-man control of access (i.e., two authorized persons must be present to enter). Use of a master or multiple key system is prohibited.

    4. Fencing. Fencing will be six foot (minimum) steel chain link with a one-foot overhang mounted on steel or reinforced concrete posts over firm base. Clear zones will be established 30 feet inside and 12 feet outside the perimeter fence (provided there is adequate space).

    5. Surveillance and Guard. A full-time guard force or combination guard force and intrusion detection system (IDS) will be provided. When the IDS is not operational, 24-hour guard surveillance is required.

    6. Access to Storage Facilities. Two authorized persons will be required to be present during any activity that affords access to storage facilities containing [insert missile/system]. Lock and key procedures will be developed to ensure that no single individual can obtain unescorted or unobserved access to [insert missile/system] storage facilities.

  2. Accountability

    1. A 100 percent physical inventory of [insert items required to be inventoried], when applicable, will be taken monthly by the purchaser. A 100 percent physical inventory by serial number shall be taken quarterly of [insert items] issued at the operational unit level. A 100 percent physical inventory by serial number shall be taken semiannually of [insert items] stored or retained at installation, depot, post, or base level. To ensure verification, two people must conduct all inventories. [Insert items] expended during peacetime will be accounted for by serial number.

    2. The [insert appropriate foreign country SAO] will be permitted to conduct a U.S. inspection and inventory of [insert items] by serial number annually. As appropriate, [insert items] are required to be inventoried annually by physical count. Inventory and accountability records maintained by the purchaser will be made available for review.

  3. Transportation. Movements of [insert appropriate missile] will meet U.S. standards for safeguarding classified material in transit as specified by the USG in DoD 5100.76- M (current revision), "Physical Security of Sensitive Conventional Arms, Munitions, and Explosives" (standards of which will be provided to the purchaser), and paragraph h below.

  4. Access to Hardware and Classified Information

    1. Access to hardware and related classified information will be limited to military and civilian personnel of the purchasing Government (except for authorized U.S. personnel as specified herein) who have the proper security clearance and who have an established need to know the information in order to perform their duties. Information released will be limited to that necessary to perform assigned responsibility and, where possible, will be oral or visual only.

    2. Maintenance that requires access to the interior of the [insert missile, operational system, etc] beyond that required of the operator, and maintenance or repair that requires access to the interior of the guidance assembly of [insert item(s)] will be performed under U.S. control.

  5. Compromise, Loss, Theft, and Unauthorized Use. The purchaser will report through the security assistance office and country team to the DoS by the most expeditious means any instances of compromise, unauthorized use, loss or theft of any [insert missile and any other materiel] or related information. This will be followed by prompt investigation and the results of the investigation will be provided through the same channels.

  6. Third-Party Access. The recipient will agree that no information on [insert appropriate missile] will be released to a third-country Government, person or other third-country entity without U.S. approval.

  7. Damaged/Expended Materiel. Damaged [insert systems, materiel] will be returned to the U.S. Army for repair or demilitarization.

  8. Conditions of Shipment and Storage for [insert missile system]. Principal components (missiles and, as applicable, gripstocks or launchers) of the [insert missile system and any other items requiring separate storage] will be stored in at least two separate locations and will be shipped [insert how; e.g., in separate containers, separately]. The storage locations will be physically separated sufficiently so that a penetration of the security at one site will not place other sites at risk.

  9. Conditions of Use. Assembly of the system will not be permitted for field exercises or deployments wherein the use of the [insert appropriate missile] system is simulated. In such cases, inert training devices may be used. The recipient will use information on the [insert appropriate missile] only for the purpose for which it was given."

 

Note Usage

Mandatory for LOAs for sales of MANPADS to purchasers other than NATO, NATO Nations, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand.

Note Text

"Purchaser agrees to adhere to the following additional security requirements associated with [insert appropriate missile/system]. Modification of specified requirements to meet indigenous conditions may be approved by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DAMO-ODL-S), U.S. Army.

  1. Physical Security. The [insert appropriate missile] will be stored in magazines that are at least equivalent in strength to U.S. Army requirements as specified in subparagraph (1) below. The purchaser also agrees to comply with U.S. Army specified requirements for lighting, doors, locks, keys, fencing, and surveillance and guard systems. Specific requirements will be agreed upon and installed prior to delivery of the missile system. U.S. Army representatives will be allowed to verify security measures and procedures established for implementation of these requirements.

    1. Magazines. Reinforced concrete, arch type, earth covered whose construction is at least equivalent in strength to the requirements of Chapter 5, DoD 6055.9-STD, "Ammunition and Explosive Safety Standards," July 1999, will be used for storage (standards of which will be provided to the purchaser).

    2. Lighting. Lighting will be provided for exterior doors and along perimeter barriers. Security lighting requirements will conform to the ammunition and safety requirements of U.S. Army Technical Manual 9-1300-206, Appendix C (standards of which will be provided to the purchaser).

    3. Doors, Locks, and Keys. Exterior doors will be class five steel vault doors secured by two key-operated high security padlocks and a high security shrouded hasp. Keys will be secured separately to ensure effective two-man control of access (i.e., two authorized persons must be present to enter). Use of a master or multiple key system is prohibited.

    4. Fencing. Fencing will be six foot (minimum) steel chain link with a one-foot overhang mounted on steel or reinforced concrete posts over firm base. Clear zones will be established 30 feet inside and 12 feet outside the perimeter fence (provided there is adequate space).

    5. Surveillance and Guard. A full-time guard force or combination guard force and intrusion detection system (IDS) will be provided. When the IDS is not operational, 24-hour guard surveillance is required.

    6. Access to Storage Facilities. Two authorized persons will be required to be present during any activity that affords access to storage facilities containing [insert missile/system]. Lock and key procedures will be developed to ensure that no single individual can obtain unescorted or unobserved access to [insert missile/system] storage facilities.

  2. Accountability

    1. Each month, the purchaser will take a 100 percent physical inventory of [insert items required to be inventoried], when applicable. A 100 percent physical inventory by serial number shall be taken quarterly of [insert items] issued at the operational unit level. A 100 percent physical inventory by serial number shall be taken semiannually of [insert items] stored or retained at installation, depot, post, or base level. To ensure verification, two people must conduct all inventories. [Insert items] expended during peacetime will be accounted for by serial number.

    2. The [insert appropriate foreign country SAO] will be permitted to conduct a U.S. inspection and inventory of [insert items] by serial number annually. As appropriate, [insert items] are required to be inventoried annually by physical count. Inventory and accountability records maintained by the purchaser will be made available for review.

  3. Transportation. Movements of [insert appropriate missile] will meet U.S. standards for safeguarding classified material in transit as specified by the USG in DoD 5100.76-M (current revision), "Physical Security of Sensitive Conventional Arms, Munitions, and Explosives" (standards of which will be provided to the purchaser), and paragraph h below.

  4. Access to Hardware and Classified Information.

    1. Access to hardware and related classified information will be limited to military and civilian personnel of the purchaser (except for authorized U.S. personnel as specified herein) who have the proper security clearance and who have an established need to know the information in order to perform their duties. Information released will be limited to that necessary to perform assigned responsibility and, where possible, will be oral or visual only.

    2. Maintenance that requires access to the interior of the [insert missile, operational system, etc.] beyond that required of the operator, and maintenance or repair that requires access to the interior of the guidance assembly of [insert item(s)] will be performed under U.S. control.

  5. Compromise, Loss, Theft, and Unauthorized Use. The purchaser will report through the security assistance office and country team to the DoS by the most expeditious means any instances of compromise, unauthorized use, loss or theft of any [insert missile and any other materiel] or related information. This will be followed by prompt investigation and the results of the investigation will be provided through the same channels.

  6. Third-Party Access. The recipient will agree that no information on [insert appropriate missile] will be released to a third-country Government, person or other third-country entity without U.S. approval.

  7. Damaged/Expended Materiel. Damaged [insert systems, materiel] will be returned to the U.S. Army for repair or demilitarization.

  8. Conditions of Shipment and Storage for [insert missile system]. Principal components (missiles and, as applicable, gripstocks or launchers) of the [insert missile system and any other items requiring separate storage] will be stored in at least two separate locations and will be shipped [insert how; e.g., in separate containers, separately]. The storage locations will be physically separated sufficiently so that a penetration of the security at one site will not place other sites at risk.

  9. Conditions of Use.

    1. The two principle components of the [insert appropriate missile system and any other items] may be brought together and assembled under the following circumstances:

      1. In the event of hostilities or imminent hostilities.

      2. For firing as part of regularly scheduled training; however, only those rounds to be fired will be withdrawn from storage and assembled.

      3. For lot testing; however, only rounds to be tested will be withdrawn from storage and assembled.

      4. When systems are deployed as part of the point defenses of high priority installations or activities (e.g., key Government buildings, military headquarters, essential utilities, air defense facilities).

    2. The purchaser will advise the U.S. Security Assistance Organization in advance of any assembly of the various missile and [insert any other items] for the [insert appropriate missile] for training or lot testing.

    3. The U.S. Government will be notified of deployments through the Security Assistance Organization."

Attachment 5

Tiger Team After Action Review (TAR)
Goldern Centry End Use Monitoring (EUM) Assessment Visit

Todays Date:

Country:

Start Date:

Return Date:

Execuitive Summary

 

 

Itinerary

 

 

Findings

 

 

Findings

 

 

Satisfactory

Yes/No

Need Improvement

Yes/No

Unsatisfactory

Yes/No

Comments

 

 

Tiger Team After Action Review (TAR)
Goldern Centry End Use Monitoring (EUM) Assessment Visit

Sampled Enhanced EUM Observations and Required Actions
Tiger Team After Action Review (TAR) Commodities Host Nation Observations United States Government Observations Required Actions (POC)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

+ Denotes Requisite Standards Have Been Met

U - Unsatisfactory

- Denotes Corrective Actions Required

I - Incopmplete

Tiger Team After Action Review (TAR)
Goldern Centry End Use Monitoring (EUM) Assessment Visit

Tiger Team After ACtion Review (TAR) Commodity

 

Sampler Name/Organization

 

Host Nation Procedures

 

 

 

 

USG Procedures

 

 

 

 

DSCA Procedures (If Any)

 

 

 

 

Conclusion