



## DEFENSE SECURITY COOPERATION AGENCY

2800 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2800

20 MAY 2024

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE FOR  
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS  
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY FOR  
DEFENSE EXPORTS AND COOPERATION  
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY FOR  
INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS  
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT AGENCY  
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEMS AGENCY  
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY  
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY  
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DIRECTOR, SECURITY COOPERATION ACCOUNTING  
DIRECTORATE, DEFENSE FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING  
SERVICE, INDIANAPOLIS OPERATIONS  
DIRECTOR OF CYBERSECURITY DIRECTORATE AND DEPUTY  
NATIONAL MANAGER FOR NATIONAL SECURITY  
SYSTEMS, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

SUBJECT: Defense Security Cooperation Agency Policy Memorandum 24-45, Mandatory Enhanced End Use Monitoring Physical Security and Accountability Note for Enhanced End Use Monitoring-designated Tomahawk Weapon System [SAMM E-Change 695]

Effective immediately, Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM) Appendix 6 is updated by adding the standard Enhanced End Use Monitoring (EEUM) note for the EEUM-designated Tomahawk Weapon System. This change will require Letters of Offer and Acceptance (LOAs) for the Tomahawk Weapon System to include the standard EEUM note. The Tomahawk Weapon System, identified as EEUM, has already been added to the SAMM [Table C8.T4](#).

If you have questions regarding this change, please contact DSCA (Office of International Operations, Global Execution Directorate (IOPS/GEX)), at [dsca.eumhelpdesk@dsca.mil](mailto:dsca.eumhelpdesk@dsca.mil). For general questions relating to the SAMM, please contact DSCA (Office of Strategy, Plans, and Policy, Execution Policy and Analysis Directorate (SPP/EPA)), at [dsca.ncr.spp.mbx.epa@mail.mil](mailto:dsca.ncr.spp.mbx.epa@mail.mil). Implementing Agencies should ensure

dissemination to supporting activities. The SAMM is available at <https://samm.dsca.mil/>.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'D. Ferrari'.

David Ferrari  
Assistant Director  
Strategy, Plans and Programs

Attachment: SAMM E-Change 695 – Enhanced End Use Monitoring-designated Tomahawk  
Weapon System Note

**Attachment: Security Assistance Management Manual E-Change 695**

**Enhanced End Use Monitoring-Designated Tomahawk Weapon System Note**

1. In Appendix 6, add the following note:

**Enhanced End Use Monitoring-Designated Tomahawk Weapon System Standard Physical Security and Accountability Note.**

<b>FMS:</b>	<b>BPC:</b>	<b>Date Range of Use:</b>
Yes	No	All
<b>Note Usage</b>		
Mandatory for Letters of Offer and Acceptance (LOAs) that add Enhanced End Use Monitoring (EEUM)-designated Tomahawk Weapon System.		
Mandatory for Amendments and Modifications that add or include EEUM-designated Tomahawk Weapon System if the newest version of the note is not on the implemented version of the case.		
<b>Note Input Responsibility</b>		
CWD		
<b>References</b>		
<a href="#">Table C8.T4.</a>		
<b>Note Text</b>		
<ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. Requirement. The purchaser understands that this system has been designated for Enhanced End Use Monitoring. This will include, but not be limited to, U.S. Government inventories of the Tomahawk Weapon System (TWS) by serial number, review of security controls and procedures, inventory and accountability documentation, transportation access controls, and storage of hardware and technical data. The TWS missile requires Category III protection as stated in <a href="#">Department of Defense (DoD) manual 5100.76-M, "Physical Security of Sensitive Conventional Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives,"</a> current version. Specific requirements for the protection of the TWS missiles listed on this offer must be documented and agreed upon during the site visit referenced in Paragraph 6 of this note and implemented prior to delivery of the missiles. The purchaser agrees to adhere to the security requirements and U.S. Government verification checks as outlined in the following paragraphs.</li><li>2. Storage. The TWS missiles must be stored in facilities that are at least equivalent in strength to U.S. Government requirements. Specific requirements for storage must be agreed upon and met prior to delivery of the missiles. U.S. Government representatives must be allowed to verify security measures and procedures prior to and following the delivery of the missiles.</li></ol>		

3. Inventory and Accountability Documentation. The purchaser must have procedures in place that provide a continuous accounting of TWS missile receipt, transfer, storage, shipment. The purchaser agrees to inventory 100% of the missiles on this Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA), serial number to missile, on a monthly basis. The U.S. Government must be permitted, upon request, to conduct an assessment of the physical security and accountability measures and inventory 100% of all missiles transferred under this LOA. Inventory and accountability documentation by the purchaser must be retained throughout the period of ownership and must be made available for review upon U.S. Government request. The purchaser must immediately notify the U.S. Government (through the Security Cooperation Organization (SCO) to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)) of any missile expenditures, compromises, or losses and provide necessary assistance if the U.S. Government desires to initiate recovery operations.
4. Storage of Hardware and Technical Data. Storage of missile hardware and technical data must meet U.S. Government standards for safeguarding the missile. The purchaser must maintain strict accountability records on all classified information provided by the U.S. Government related to the missiles including extracts and copies. These records must include documentary evidence of any missiles or components that are lost or destroyed. These records must be made available for review upon U.S. Government request. Such records will, to the extent possible, be centralized.
  - a. Doors, Locks, and Keys. Exterior doors will be class five steel vault doors secured by a key-operated high security padlock and hasp. Use of a master or multiple key system is prohibited.
  - b. Fencing. Fencing will be six-foot (minimum) steel chain link with a one-foot overhang mounted on steel or reinforced concrete posts over firm base. Clear zones will be established 30 feet inside and 12 feet outside the perimeter. A 45-degree outrigger or "Y" configuration with 3 strands of barbwire is required on the fencing. The bottom of the fence will extend 2 inches into the ground.
5. Reporting. The purchaser must report immediately to the SCO, or other appropriate U.S. Government representative, any allegations, confirmed or unconfirmed, of missile hardware technology or software released or compromised to unauthorized nationals, third country nationals, or a foreign government. The purchaser must also report any allegation, report, or evidence of unauthorized attempts to collect information on the missile program.
6. Organization (O-Level) and Intermediate (I-Level) Maintenance. Except under conditions that are identified by the Tomahawk Weapons System Program Office (PMA-280), maintenance by the purchaser is prohibited. Upon approval by the U.S. Government, the purchaser's military, civilian, or industry personnel may receive the oral and visual information necessary to integrate the TWS missile.
7. Depot Level Maintenance. Missiles that require depot level repair must be transported to designated depot level repair facilities in the U.S. under the proper security procedures.
8. Site Survey. Prior to the delivery of the missiles, the U.S. Government will conduct an in-country site survey of the physical security measures and logistic chain for all facilities of the purchaser designated for storage of the TWS missiles.
  - a. The U.S. Government will provide to the purchaser a security checklist and serial numbers that should be referenced during the site survey and throughout the life of the

TWS missiles. The checklist is used to indicate that the integrity of the security measures in place for the storage of TWS missiles will ensure the equivalent level of security protection as the U.S. Government.

- b. Deficiencies identified during the site survey must be corrected prior to delivery of any TWS missiles.
  - c. The purchaser agrees to adhere to the security requirements associated with the life cycle of the TWS missiles. The purchaser agrees to allow U.S. Government verification of security arrangements for the protection of the TWS missiles on both a scheduled and unscheduled basis.
9. Transportation. Transportation of TWS missiles must meet U.S. standards for safeguarding classified material in transit. Prior to delivery of missiles to the purchaser, the transportation plan must be coordinated and approved by the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) System Security Cooperation Office (SSCO).
  10. Disposition. The purchaser is responsible for disposition associated costs and will obtain U.S. Government disposition instructions that direct transporting TWS missiles back to the U.S. Government.
  11. Expenditure Reporting. Missile expenditure reports must be completed by the purchaser for all TWS missile firings and forwarded to the SCO. The format for missile expenditure reports must be provided by the U.S. Government.

2. Update the following line in Table C8.T4. “Defense Articles Designated for EEUM for all FMS-eligible Countries”

EEUM-Designated Defense Articles		Description
From	Tomahawk Missiles	Tomahawk Missiles
To	Tomahawk Weapon System	Tomahawk Weapon System