Chapter 8, End Use Monitoring (EUM), describes the Golden Sentry EUM plan and procedures for routine and enhanced EUM (EEUM) of defense articles and services provided by the USG to partner nations. It includes procedures for assisting countries in fulfilling Department of State (State) requirements prior to retransfers, changes of end use, or disposals, and for verifying appropriate demilitarization requirements.

C8.1.1. The Golden Sentry End Use Monitoring (EUM) program is designed to verify that defense articles or services transferred by the USG to foreign recipients are being used in accordance with the terms and conditions of the transfer agreement or other applicable agreement. In accordance with Section 505 of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) (22 U.S.C. 2314), as amended, and the Section 3 (22 U.S.C. 2753) and Section 4 (22 U.S.C. 2754) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), and as reflected in the Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) Standard Terms and Conditions, recipients must agree to use U.S.-provided defense articles, training, and services only for their intended purpose; not to transfer title to, or possession of, any defense article or related training to anyone not an officer, employee, or agent of that country or of the USG without prior written consent of the USG; to maintain the security of any article with substantially the same degree of protection afforded to it by the USG; and to permit observation and review by, and to furnish necessary information to, representatives of the USG with regards to use of such articles. EUM provides USG oversight to ensure these conditions are met. All potential end use violations must be reported through Department of State (State) channels. Information regarding any potential violations should also be forwarded to the Golden Sentry program team at the (DSCA) (Office of International Operations, Global Execution Directorate, Assistance & Monitoring Division (IOPS/GEX/AMD)), the appropriate geographic Combatant Command (CCMD), and the appropriate U.S. Military Department (MILDEP).

C8.2.1. Section 40A of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) (22 U.S.C 2785) requires the President to establish an End Use Monitoring (EUM) program to improve accountability with respect to defense articles sold, leased, or exported under the AECA or Foreign Assistance Act (FAA). The Director, DSCA, has been delegated authority by the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD (P)) to administer DoD’s Golden Sentry EUM program, to comply with Section 40A of the AECA. Section 40A requires the EUM program be designed to provide reasonable assurance, to the extent practicable, that the recipient is complying with the requirements imposed by the USG with respect to the use, transfer, and security of defense articles and defense services. The program must also provide for the end use verification of defense articles and services that incorporate sensitive technology, and/or are particularly vulnerable to diversion or other misuse, or whose diversion or other misuse could have significant consequences. Congress requires an annual report describing actions taken to implement Section 40A, including a detailed accounting of the costs and number of personnel associated with the monitoring program.

C8.2.2. Golden Sentry’s objective is to ensure compliance with technology control requirements in order to minimize security risks to the United States, partner nations, and Allies. EUM includes all actions to prevent misuse or unauthorized transfer of defense articles or services from title transfer until disposal. The type of defense article or service generally determines the level of monitoring required. The Director, DSCA, may also determine, in consultation at the General Officer, Flag Officer, or Senior Executive Service (SES) level, that a change in physical security and accountability monitoring may be warranted after considering the specific defense article or service in question and based on assessment of the threat to security in the area or for other compelling reasons. When changing events or other unusual circumstances prompt Security Cooperation Organizations (SCOs) concern regarding the end use and security of U.S.-provided defense articles and services, SCOs should contact DSCA (Office of International Operations (IOPS)) to obtain further guidance. SCO requests for modification in physical security and accountability monitoring must be formally submitted in writing and endorsed by the geographic Combatant Command (CCMD) prior to being forwarded to DSCA.

C8.2.3. End Use Monitoring Responsibilities. Monitoring the use of U.S.-origin items is a joint responsibility of the partner nations and the USG, to include the Military Departments (MILDEPs), the CCMDs, and the SCOs. USG representatives have full responsibility for defense articles until title is transferred to the partner nation. The partner nation assumes this responsibility for transferred items based on the terms under which the transfers are made, including restrictions on physical security and accountability. USG representatives retain a continuing responsibility under Golden Sentry to assist DSCA to verify the appropriate end use and security of U.S.-origin defense articles and defense services sold or transferred on a government-to-government basis. Table C8.T2. lists the EUM responsibilities for various DoD organizations.

C8.2.4. Post-Delivery Monitoring. Post-delivery monitoring is performed by USG personnel assigned to SCOs or deployed to the partner nation in support of SCO functions. The Golden Sentry program employs two post-delivery monitoring methodologies to perform DoD’s EUM responsibilities: Routine and Enhanced EUM (REUM and EEUM, respectively). To assist SCOs in conducting post-delivery monitoring of both types, an EUM application is available in SCIP-EUM as a repository of data, to record REUM and EEUM checks, and as a means to generate reports. SCOs must develop EUM SOPs to implement country-specific EUM policy and procedures. A copy of the SOP must be forwarded to dsca.eumhelpdesk@mail.mil. Written SOPs must contain at a minimum the following information:

C8.3.1. Routine End Use Monitoring (REUM) is required for all defense articles and services provided via government-to-government programs. Security Cooperation Organization (SCO) personnel are required to observe and report to the Combatant Command (CCMD), DSCA, and Department of State (State) any potential misuse or unapproved transfer of U.S.-origin defense articles. SCO personnel should perform REUM checks at every available opportunity in conjunction with other security cooperation functions, during visits to the partner nation’s installations, through interaction with other assigned embassy personnel, and from any other readily available or opportune source of information. SCOs must conduct REUM checks at least quarterly and must document all REUM checks in the Security Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP)-EUM database using the REUM check entry form available on the REUM page.

C8.3.1.1. To assist SCOs in conducting REUM checks, DSCA has developed a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) REUM Summary Report located in the SCIP-EUM database under the Queries/Reports menu. This report provides a list of specific categories of defense articles exported via FMS that includes, but is not limited to: battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery systems, fixed and rotary wing aircraft, unmanned aerial systems (UAS), warships and military vessels, missiles and missile systems, military vehicles, bombs, crew served and individual weapons, and night vision devices (NVDs) or systems. To assist SCOs in electronically documenting REUM checks performed, DSCA developed a REUM template located in the SCIP-EUM database under the Support-Policy/Procedures Memos.

C8.3.2. Articles or Services Requiring Additional Controls on End Use. There are instances in which particular items normally subject to REUM are transferred with notes restricting the conditions under which they may be transported, stored, or employed. SCOs should be aware of these restrictions and alert to indications or reports that suggest failure to comply.

C8.3.2.1. Arms, Ammunition, & Explosives. Arms, Ammunition and Explosives (AA&E) items require special protection and security measures. The DoD applies stringent AA&E controls while these items are in U.S. custody, and the same standards must be applied to the items upon release to the purchaser. During Case Development, Implementing Agencies (IAs) should assess secure transportation and distribution options that support customer preferences. A detailed Transportation Plan is required by DoD prior to delivery of the materiel. Once approved, a Transportation Plan becomes an integral part of the Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) and is available for review by U.S. Customs and security officials. Although recipient countries generally do not assume control of sensitive AA&E items within the continental United States (CONUS), except as cargo loaded and prepared for departure, USG security standards must apply throughout the lifecycle of the weapon system (e.g., transportation, delivery, testing, operational use, storage, and destruction processes). Additionally, a site survey may be required to ensure that appropriate physical security measures are in place at the destination prior to the delivery of the weapon systems. See Department of Defense Manuall (DoDM) 5100.76 "Physical Security of Sensitive Conventional Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives (AA&E)", and the Section C7.15. for more information regarding AA&E items.

C8.3.2.2. White Phosphorous and Cluster Munitions. Munitions containing White Phosphorous (See Section C4.4.8.) and cluster munitions permissible for transfer under U.S. law (See Section C4.4.6.) are transferred with restrictions on the conditions under which they may by employed. SCOs should be aware of partner nation inventories of these weapons and the restrictions on them, and alert to reports of how the partner nation is employing them in operations. SCOs should report to DSCA (Office of International Operations (IOPS)) and Country Portfolio Director (CPD)) any information that suggests these items are not being used in accordance with the terms under which they were sold.

C8.4.1. Definition. Enhanced End Use Monitoring (EEUM), based on the principle of trust with verification, is required for defense articles or munitions controlled items designated for EEUM by the military department‘s (MILDEP's) export policy, the inter-agency release process, or by the DoD policy as a result of consultation with Congress and/or the Department of State (State). EEUM requires physical security assessments of the storage facilities and serial number inventories of designated defense articles to verify compliance with the transfer conditions of the Letters of Offer and Acceptance (LOAs) and other government-to-government transfer agreements. All EEUM-designated defense articles are required to be sold on defined order lines using an EEUM-coded Military Articles and Services List (MASL) and are accompanied by specialized physical security and accountability notes. The defense articles listed in Table C8.T4. below have been designated for EEUM for all Foreign Military Sales (FMS)-eligible countries. Other defense articles may require EEUM and/or additional U.S. control measures (e.g. U.S. custody and/or electronic monitoring) on a case-by-case basis as determined in the transfer approval process.

C8.4.1.1. SCOs are responsible for maintaining an accurate baseline of all EEUM-designated defense articles exported to the partner nation. The baseline must be maintained by using the EUM application in the Security Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP)-EUM database to document all EEUM-designated items delivered to the partner nation, inventory monitoring and historical data. The SCIP-EUM database provides a centralized, secure information repository of EUM data gained from deliveries and inventories of all EEUM-designated defense articles transferred through FMS, grant assistance, and other security cooperation (SC) programs. The SCIP-EUM database provides a Reconciliation Report of EEUM-designated defense articles by country that SCOs must use as the basis for establishing the baseline and all required inventories and reporting. Recording in the SCIP-EUM database includes accountability of inventories and final disposition, i.e., expended, lost, and destroyed, of all EEUM-designated defense articles. To ensure that an accurate baseline of the EEUM-designated items is maintained, SCOs must ensure the partner nation reports any losses, firings/expenditures, or disposal of any EEUM-designated defense article as required in the transfer agreement and enter the information in the SCIP-EUM database. SCOs must immediately report losses of EEUM-designated defense articles to DSCA (IOPS), the geographic Combatant Commands (CCMDs) and Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Office of Regional Security and Arms Transfers (State (PM/RSAT)) for situational awareness. After the initial report, the SCO must work with the partner nation to obtain a written report with details of the incident and forward the report to DSCA (IOPS) within 30 calendar days. The report should include the steps being taken to recover the equipment (if applicable) and to prevent recurrence. SCOs must annotate the loss in the SCIP-EUM database by changing the item(s) disposition and must ensure that the partner nation’s report is properly uploaded in the database as supporting documentation and historical record of the loss.

C8.4.1.2. SCOs are required to conduct EEUM checks through planned/coordinated visits to the partner nation’s installations to verify in-country receipt of EEUM-designated defense articles by serial number within 90 days of delivery. If during the conduct of the initial inventory the items are located at their storage sites (not temporary holding areas such as customs facilities), an assessment of the storage site(s) must also be performed. Subsequent EEUM checks require serial number verification and physical security assessments of storage sites or other facilities where EEUM-designated defense articles are kept verifying that recipients are complying with the terms and conditions stated in the transfer agreements. SCOs must visually inventory 100 percent of in-country EEUM-designated defense articles within one year from the last inventory performed, except for those EEUM-designated defense articles not available for observation (deployed, returned to the United States for repair, etc.), or as stipulated otherwise in the SCIP-EUM database or by separate policy memo. The inventory must include review of the recipient’s accountability procedures and inventory records as required by the LOA or other transfer document. EEUM-designated items not available for inventory during their annual inventory cycle due to deployment, returned to the United States for repair, or other legitimate reason, must be inventoried within 90 days after returning from deployment or repair. SCOs must confirm with the respective MILDEP program office or U.S. vendor, the accountability of all EEUM-designated items under repair prior to annotating the items’ deployed status in the SCIP-EUM database. SCOs will provide the partner nation formal notification of all findings noted during EEUM checks and request the partner nation to provide within 60 days a report specifying the actions being taken to correct the findings.

C8.4.1.3. EEUM checks must be performed using DoD Golden Sentry EEUM checklists and the policy guidance and procedures published in the SCIP-EUM database. One checklist must be used and filled out for each storage facility assessed. All EEUM checks must be recorded using the DoD Golden Sentry EEUM checklists, and the checklists must be attached to the inventory records electronically via the SCIP-EUM database. Golden Sentry seals (cables and labels) can be installed on containers (if feasible and the partner nation allows it), to increase security of the missiles and reduce labor during future annual inventories. The seals are obtained from DSCA’s EUM team but must be controlled by USG personnel to prevent proliferation.

C8.4.1.4. All COMSEC products require EEUM and is documented in COMSEC management systems other than SCIP. Transferred COMSEC products are changed from EEUM to Routine EUM in SCIP (unless EEUM for additional reasons other than COMSEC) but retain the EEUM and documentation requirements, as follows:

C8.4.1.4.1. The EEUM of COMSEC products purchased by Partners or Allies and retained by USG or industry for testing, integration, etc., is performed by the USG or industry's respective COMSEC safeguarding, accountability, and reporting procedures.

C8.4.1.4.2. The EEUM of COMSEC products transferred to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), NATO member nations, Australia, and New Zealand is performed by recipient nation in accordance with their COMSEC policies and regulations.

C8.4.1.4.3. The EEUM of COMSEC products transferred to international organizations other than NATO and non-NATO member nations except Australia and New Zealand who have signed a Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA) or like agreement is accomplished by the FMS-funded U.S. COMSEC custodians.

C8.4.1.4.4. The EEUM of COMSEC products transferred to non-NATO member nations who have not signed a CISMOA or like agreement is accomplished by the SCOs and reported to their respective theater CCMD Theater COMSEC Account. CCMDs must ensure SCOs perform the required COMSEC security and accountability checks.

C8.4.1.5. Network Enabled Weapons (NEW) with NSA Type 1 COMSEC encrypted datalink require COMSEC EUM in accordance with Section C8.4.1.4. and may require additional monitoring requirements. See Table C8.T4.

C8.4.2. Enhanced End Use Monitoring Designation Process. EEUM requires commitment of USG resources; therefore, all documents designating defense articles for EEUM by the MILDEPs or Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy (OSD (P)) will be approved and signed at the General Officer, Flag Officer or Senior Executive Service (SES)-level. Documents designating defense articles for EEUM through the interagency technology release process will be signed by the respective committee chairman. Some defense articles may require additional U.S. control measures (e.g. U.S. custody) as a condition of the transfer approval. In these cases, all costs necessary to implement the additional USG control measures levied as part of the transfer approval (beyond regular EEUM checks as stated in Sections C8.4.1. through C8.4.1.3. of this chapter) will be paid by the purchaser. The purchaser’s obligation to pay for these additional security measures will be stated in the LOA security and accountability note. Figure C8.F1. depicts the decision process used to determine whether an item or an individual transfer will be identified and designated for EEUM. Figure C8.F2. (standard EEUM) and Figure C8.F3. (case unique EEUM) depicts the flow process response to items designated as requiring EEUM. DSCA staffing to ensure that all required actions are taken to add defense articles to EEUM list include the following.

C8.4.2.1. Determining the Military Articles and Services List End Use Monitoring Code. DSCA (Office of International Operations, Global Execution Directorate, Assistance & Monitoring Division (IOPS/GEX/AMD)), will coordinate with DSCA (Office of Business Operations (OBO)) and the respective MILDEP to determine the item's MASL EUM code. The MASL EUM code of an item designated as Enhanced for all FMS exports will be coded as "E". The MASL EUM code of an item designated for Routine EUM will be coded as "R". If it is determined in the transfer approval process that an item normally handled as Routine is required to be treated as Enhanced for a specific sale, the Implementing Agency (IA) will request a Case-Unique MASL coded "E" for use of the sale.

C8.4.2.2. Developing Letter of Offer and Acceptance Physical Security and Accountability Enhanced End Use Monitoring Note. For the defense articles listed in the Table C8.T4. as EEUM, DSCA (IOPS/GEX/AMD), in coordination with the MILDEPs/IAs (Headquarters and Program Offices), the Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA) (International Security Programs (ISP)), DSCA (Office of Strategy, Plans, and Policy (SPP)), DSCA (Office of International Operations, Weapons Directorate (IOPS/WPN)), and DSCA (Front Office, Office of the General Counsel (FO/OGC)) will lead all staffing efforts to ensure that the MILDEPs/IAs develop the physical security and accountability (EEUM) notes. MILDEPs/IAs are responsible for providing DSCA subject matter expert support in drafting security, accountability, and USG control measures included on the LOA to ensure that the parameters levied in the EEUM-designation are met for all EEUM defense articles. EEUM Notes that are coordinated and approved by DSCA (IOPS/GEX/AMD) for an Enhanced Case-Unique article will be used each time the same Enhanced Case-Unique article is included on a different LOA.

C8.4.2.3. Publishing Physical Security and Accountability Enhanced End Use Monitoring Notes for Inclusion on the Letter of Offer and Acceptance. DSCA Standard EEUM and physical security an accountability notes (listed in Appendix 6) will be included in the LOA by DSCA (Office of International Operations, Global Execution Directorate, Case Writing and Development Division (IOPS/GEX/CWD)). Enhanced Case-Unique EEUM notes will be included in the LOA by the IA responsible for these articles.

C8.4.2.4. Developing and Validating Enhanced End Use Monitoring Checklists. DSCA (IOPS/GEX/AMD) will coordinate with the respective MILDEP/IA, as required, to develop and publish in the SCIP EUM database the DoD Golden Sentry EEUM checklists for the weapons system or technology designated for EEUM. The relevant SCO and DSCA (IOPS/GEX/AMD) will validate the DoD Golden Sentry EEUM checklists during EEUM checks and will provide the MILDEP/IA recommendations for improvement when required.

C8.4.3. Site Surveys/Certification of Storage Facilities. With the exception of NVDs and COMSEC equipment, and hostile environments (See Section C8.5.5.), IAs/MILDEPS are responsible for conducting physical security inspections for certifications of partner nations’ storage facilities before EEUM-designated weapons systems and enhanced case-unique weapons systems are delivered or moved to a new or uncertified facility. IA/MILDEP will certify foreign countries’ weapons storage facilities to standards specified in accordance with Department of Defense Manual (DoDM) 5100.76 “Physical Security of Sensitive Conventional Arms, Ammunition and Explosives,” or by other appropriate authorities for EEUM articles not listed in DoDM 5100.76. Discrepancies identified during the physical security storage facility inspections shall be corrected or compensatory measures implemented prior to shipment of any EEUM-designated items and enhanced case-unique weapons systems.

C8.4.3.1. Security Managers and Site Certification Reports. The IA/MILDEP will ensure DSCA has a current list, by weapon system, of all security inspectors/managers responsible for conducting physical security inspections and certifications. The IA/MILDEP will provide DSCA a copy of all facility certification reports within 30 calendar days of conducting the facility certification by ensuring the reports are uploaded to the site certification repository within the SCIP-EUM database.

C8.4.3.2. Facility Certification Costs. Table C9.T2a. (lines L16 and CE43) addresses the proper source of funding to pay for foreign facility certifications. Certification of foreign sites/facilities storing equipment designated for EEUM and enhanced case-unique weapons systems shall be case-funded. FMS admin funds may be used to certify foreign facilities prior to LOA implementation; however, these costs must be reimbursed on the subsequent LOA. If a LOA is never implemented, the IA Pre-Letter of Request (LOR) funds remain the proper funding source.

C8.4.3.3. Facility Certification Reciprocity. Foreign partner facility certifications shall be conducted consistent with the appropriate Security Risk Category (SRC) of the weapon system to be stored. Excluding specified compensatory measures, facility certifications by one IA/MILDEP in one SRC are reciprocally accepted for storage of weapons systems offered by another MILDEP in the same SRC when applicable. IA/MILDEP security inspectors/managers will coordinate facility inspection visits with DSCA, SCOs, and other MILDEPs in advance to prevent the need to conduct a new facility inspection if another IA/MILDEP has already certified the same facility. The site certification repository within the SCIP-EUM database will indicate if certification by another IA/MILDEP already exists at a proposed storage location. DSCA will work with the IA/MILDEP to ensure standardized physical security inspection/certification checklists are developed for each SRC.

C8.4.3.4. Compensatory Measures. All IA/MILDEP facility certifications shall be conducted consistent with the appropriate SRC of the weapon system to be stored and other items designated as EEUM must be protected to substantially the same level of security as afforded by the USG. The IA/MILDEP must document any areas where the foreign facilities do not meet the physical security requirements stated in DoDM 5100.76, by other appropriate authorities, stipulated in the LOAs, or required by using risk management principles and will identify if any acceptable compensatory measures are in place or required. SCOs shall verify that compensatory measures remain in place during annual inspections as documented by the IA/MILDEP.

C8.4.3.5. Facility Changes. Substantial changes to certified facilities at any time that cause them to no longer meet the physical security requirements will need to be recertified. In addition, newly built foreign storage facilities will need to be certified prior to storing designated EEUM articles and enhanced case-unique weapon systems. The effort to certify and recertify storage facilities shall be case-funded. SCOs will report foreign facility discrepancies and newly-built foreign facilities storing EEUM-designated items and enhanced case-unique weapons systems to DSCA and the IA/MILDEP within 72-hours after discovery.

C8.4.4. EEUM Cost Reporting Requirements. DSCA is responsible for submitting an annual report to Congress, as required by AECA Section 40A (22 U.S.C. 2785), through Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (State (PM)) that includes the costs for executing the Golden Sentry program.

C8.4.4.1. At the end of each fiscal year, the CCMDs and SCOs are required to submit the actual annual costs and future two-year Foreign Military Financing (FMF) Administrative budget projections associated with conducting EEUM, including travel to perform physical security and accountability inventories of in-country equipment and future deliveries and to attend EUM training. To maintain accurate cost data and reporting, EUM managers should ensure that upon completion of each EEUM visit that the cost is documented and entered into the Defense Agencies Initiative (DAI) Code 210.15. Each entry will include a brief description of the EEUM function performed, e.g., number of personnel, equipment inventoried, locations visited. All costs necessary to implement additional USG control measures (e.g. U.S. custody) levied as a condition of the transfer will be paid by the purchaser.

C8.4.4.2. On a case-by-case basis, SCOs may request, through the CCMD, FMF Administrative funding to meet unexpected requirements to perform EEUM checks due to disposal verifications or other unforeseen EUM-related activities for which funding was not requested in the regular budget cycle. Unfunded requirements must be submitted to the appropriate CCMD for approval. When CCMD FMF Administrative funds are not sufficient or available, CCMDs may request FMF Administrative funding from DSCA (OBO) to meet unforeseen SCO EEUM-related requirements.

C8.4.4.3. SCO questions regarding entries for conducting EEUM functions in DAI or unfunded requirement requests should be submitted to the CCMD. CCMD questions should be sent to DSCA (OBO).

C8.5.1. End Use Monitoring Visit Guidance. The Golden Sentry End Use Monitoring (EUM) program includes in-country visits. There are four types of EUM visits:

Each visit is unique to the partner nation and equipment being assessed.

C8.5.2. End Use Monitoring Familiarization and Assistance Visits Guidance. The purpose of an EUM FAV is to assist the partner nation, the Security Cooperation Organization (SCO) (or equivalent organization/office), and the Combatant Command (CCMD) in developing an effective EUM compliance program. It also provides an opportunity for the DSCA EUM representative to determine the requirements for conducting a potential future EUM CAV or VCA. A FAV may be prompted by a request from the partner nation, SCO, or the CCMD to validate EUM programs. A FAV can also be prompted by the introduction of specific equipment into the region/country. Table C8.T5. outlines the timeline and formal requirements for a well-coordinated and documented EUM FAV. Informal correspondence may occur prior to these actions.

C8.5.3. End Use Monitoring Compliance Assessment Visit Guidance. The purpose of a CAV or VCA is to review and evaluate the SCO's (or equivalent organization/office) compliance with Golden Sentry EUM policy and procedures in accordance with Table C8.T2. by using the SCO checklist (available in the Security Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP)-EUM database) and the partner nation's compliance with specific physical security and accountability requirements, as well as other terms of sale. Activities during a CAV or VCA may include facility visits, record reviews, review of Routine End Use Monitoring (REUM) and Enhanced End Use Monitoring (EEUM) policies and procedures, and inventories of U.S.-origin defense articles. EUM CAVs or VCAs are coordinated in advance with the CCMD, SCO, and partner nation to ensure the success of the assessment. To maximize resources and minimize disruptions, EUM site visits should be arranged to coincide with scheduled partner nations inventory dates whenever possible. Table C8.T6. outlines the timeline and formal requirements to ensure a well-coordinated and documented EUM CAV or VCA. Informal correspondence may occur prior to these actions. Inability to obtain proper entry credentials for the CAV or VCA Team from the recipient country will result in unfavorable reports within the Department of State (State) and DoD and may result in mention in the annual report to Congress.

C8.5.3.1. Factors DSCA considers when determining countries to be scheduled for CAVs or VCAs include, but are not limited to, the following:

C8.5.3.1.1. End Use Monitoring Virtual Compliance Assessments Guidance. A VCA is conducted similar to a CAV (See Section C8.5.3.); however, conducted remotely and without travel by DSCA staff. DSCA may conduct a VCA when circumstances exist that impede travel, including budget constraints, heightened security risk, and other limitations DSCA deems a VCA necessary. The purpose of virtual CAVs remains the same as a standard CAV, which consists of reviewing and evaluating SCOs compliance with Golden Sentry EUM Policy and partner nations' compliance with specific physical security and accountability agreements, provisos, and other terms of sale. The VCA timeline and requirements are identified in Table C8.T6. and the VCA Guidance Plan found in the SCIP-EUM database.

C8.5.3.2. To assist in planning and coordination with the partner nation, a two-year CAV plan has been institutionalized through formal message notifications to the CCMDs and SCOs. The two-year plan is published at the beginning of each fiscal year and provides a quarterly CAV or VCA schedule by CCMD and country. DSCA may, in coordination with the appropriate CCMD, perform additional out-of-cycle CAVs or VCAs as necessary to execute the EUM mission.

C8.5.3.3. Compliance Assessment Visit Rating Criteria. The CAV or VCA rating is based on the team's assessment of:

C8.5.3.3.1. SCO compliance with the policies and procedures of the Golden Sentry program SCO responsibilities stated in the SCO checklist published in the SCIP-EUM database and Table C8.T2. including:

C8.5.3.3.2. Country compliance with the conditions of the transfer agreements for U.S.-provided defense articles and services, including:

C8.5.4. Focused Verification Checks. FVCs are ad-hoc inspections of U.S.-origin defense articles for which there are concerns regarding their use, transfer, and physical security. FVCs are directed at the discretion of the Director, DSCA and provide the Director, DSCA greater visibility and real-time situational awareness of U.S.-origin defense articles. FVCs are a mechanism by which the Director can proactively address issues that could lead to actual end use violations.

C8.5.4.1. Transmittal. DSCA will transmit FVC requests to SCOs through their assigned CCMD. The transmittal will identify the type, quantity, and location of U.S.-origin defense articles to be inspected and the date by which the verification must be completed. FVC requests may include one or more U.S.-origin defense articles at one or more locations.

C8.5.4.2. Focused Verification Checks Execution. SCOs will conduct FVCs in accordance with REUM or EEUM procedures based on the EUM-designation assigned to the U.S.-origin defense article(s) being checked. In some cases, DSCA personnel may conduct the FVC. FVCs are considered complete once SCOs have uploaded or submitted all required documentation in the SCIP-EUM database, as identified in Sections C8.3. Routine EUM and C8.4. Enhanced EUM. As with any REUM or EEUM check, potential end use violations must be immediately reported to DSCA and State through their respective EUM Potential End Use Violation inbox (Unclassified: dsca.ncr.fo.mbx.eum-violations@mail.mil and PM-EUM-Incidents@state.gov; or Classified: dsca.ncr.fo.mbx.eum-violations@mail.smil.mil and PM-EUM-Incidents@state.sgov.gov).

C8.5.4.3. Extensions. SCOs may submit a written request for an extension to complete an FVC to the DSCA EUM Program Manager through their assigned combatant command. Extension requests should include the proposed new completion date and a justification for the request.

C8.5.5. Conducting End Use Monitoring in a Hostile Environment. The following policy sets procedures for the conduct of EUM when force protection limitations exist that could endanger USG personnel performing Routine EUM observations, EEUM inventories, and physical security inspections of partner nations’ storage facilities. This process applies to reporting potential violations and the accountability of EEUM defense articles identified in Table C8.T4. or other defense articles that require EEUM and/or additional U.S. required control measures as determined in the transfer approval process. To mitigate proliferation and to comply with the requirement in Section 40A of the AECA that the EUM program provide ‘reasonable assurance’ that the partner nation is complying with U.S. End Use requirements, the following procedures are to be implemented.

C8.5.5.1. Accountability of U.S. Defense Articles Deployed to Restricted Areas that Cannot be Inventoried due to Heightened Security risk. When conditions allow, the SCO or appointed U.S. designated officials who have received EUM training or, at a minimum, participated in a training session for non-EUM personnel, shall conduct an initial 100% inventory, by serial number, of all EEUM designated articles prior to shipment/movement/delivery into hostile areas. Designated U.S. officials shall be appointed or endorsed, in writing, by the Combatant Command (endorsed at the SES/07 General Officer/Flag Officer level) with the concurrence of the Ambassador when conditions exist that impede the SCO from executing their inventory responsibilities. The SCO shall upload written and endorsed designations within the SCIP-EUM database. Designated U.S. officials may be contractors or U.S. personnel serving in locally employed embassy staff positions. The SCO shall assist designated U.S. and partner nation officials in developing and implementing improved inventory management and accountability procedures of EEUM-designated defense articles currently in restricted areas.

C8.5.5.2. Partner Nation Self-Reporting. Under certain circumstances, when USG led assessments are not possible, partner nation ‘Self-Reporting’ can be accomplished by providing the SCO with records of inventories, other accountability records, or the use of barcode scanning. Partner nation self-reporting is authorized only when the following criteria are met:

C8.5.5.3. Acceptable Partner Nation Documentation. SCOs shall update, and keep current, the disposition status of U.S. provided EEUM defense articles within the SCIP-EUM database based on partner nation provided accountability documentation. The disposition status “Observed by Partner Nation” shall be used for defense articles still in partner nation possession. All documentation shall include the defense article description, serial numbers, date of observation, and current disposition status (e.g., active, expended, destroyed, or lost). Acceptable partner nation documentation can be:

C8.5.5.4. For sensitive self-reporting data at a classified level, due to operations security (OPSEC) concerns, the SCOs shall obtain, scan/upload, and forward sensitive partner nation-provided data to dsca.ncr.iops-gex-amd.mbx.eum@mail.smil.mil.

C8.5.5.5. Frequency of Self-Reporting. Frequency is dependent on the partner nation’s inventory and accountability requirements in accordance with the LOA, the EEUM Control Plan, and the partner nation self-reporting CONOPs; and subject to USG discretion.

C8.6.1. Potential End Use Violations. While conducting end use Routine End Use Monitoring (REUM) and Enhanced End Use Monitoring (EEUM) checks, the Security Cooperation Organization (SCO) personnel should be alert for unauthorized use of defense articles, defense services, or technical data, including information provided during continental United States (CONUS) or in-country training. The checks should provide information for both the recipient country and the United States to determine whether a partner nation’s generally sound processes failed due to unusual circumstances, because security and accountability procedures are not given sufficient priority, or because country interests are diverging from those of the United States. Information gained during the special checks that could be useful in correcting the immediate problem or improving future end use controls should be shared with the Department of State (State) and DSCA (Office of International Operations (IOPS)).

C8.6.2. Reporting End Use Violations. SCOs must report all potential unauthorized end use, including unauthorized access, unauthorized transfers, security violations or known equipment losses to the Combatant Command (CCMD), DSCA (Office of International Operations, Global Execution Directorate, Assistance & Monitoring Division (IOPS/GEX/AMD)), and Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Office of Regional Security and Arms Transfers (State(PM/RSAT)). SCOs shall be alert to, and report on, any indication that U.S. origin defense articles are being used for unauthorized purposes, are being tampered with or reverse engineered, or are accessible by persons who are not officers, employees, or agents of the recipient government. Potential violations shall be notified via email or message immediately. SCOs must assess the sensitivity of the potential violation and other factors to determine the means of notification. State investigates and reports potential violations and determines whether the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) Section 3 (22 U.S.C. 2753) criteria require notification to Congress.

C8.6.2.1. Reporting. The President is obligated, pursuant to AECA Section 3(c)(2), to report end use violations to Congress. State, with input from DoD, is the lead agency responsible for reporting end use violations. All DoD personnel must report any suspected End Use violations of U.S.-origin defense articles, including unauthorized access, unauthorized transfers, security violations, or known equipment losses, to the USG either through the SCO or directly to DSCA and State through their respective End Use Monitoring (EUM) Potential End Use Violation inbox (Unclassified: dsca.ncr.fo.mbx.eum-violations@mail.mil and PM-EUM-Incidents@state.gov; or Classified: dsca.ncr.fo.mbx.eum-violations@mail.smil.mil and PM-EUM-Incidents@state.sgov.gov). Any non-DoD personnel may also report suspected end use violations directly to these same organizations or through the same email addresses.

C8.6.2.2. Reporting Requirements. A SCO must report a potential end use violation or submit an update to a previously reported potential violation, on the basis of information from any source, including a private person unaffiliated with the USG or a foreign citizen. Suspected end use violation reports should include, to the maximum extent possible, the following information:

C8.6.2.2.1. When available, the incident number should always be included in the subject line of any updates as well as the update number, e.g. 1st Update, 2nd Update, etc. Reports involving classified information must be transmitted via a secure, classified network.

C8.6.2.2.2. Upon receipt of an incident report, State will take the lead on coordinating the USG response, which will include potential courses of action. When State receives information on potential end use violations through its channels, it will share that information with DSCA.

C8.6.2.2.3. Roles and Responsibilities for Investigation of a Suspected End Use Violation.

C8.6.2.2.3.1. Security Cooperation Organization. Forwards reports received from other USG or non-USG personnel as well as any potential violations uncovered during Enhanced- or Routine-EUM checks to the appropriate DoD and State EUM Potential Violation email inboxes. Assists in collecting or obtaining additional information related to a potential EUM violation. Assists in the enforcement and application of consequences, as determined by the State, resulting from confirmed end use violations.

C8.6.2.2.3.2. Defense Security Cooperation Agency (Office of International Operations, Global Execution Directorate, Assistance & Monitoring Division). DSCA (IOPS/GEX/AMD) monitors/manages the classified and unclassified DoD EUM Potential Violation email inbox. Maintains a master repository of reported potential end use violations. Ensures the SCO and proper points of contact (POCs) at the CCMD are aware of all reported potential violations in their Area of Responsibility (AOR). Assigns potential violation reports an incident tracking number. Assesses reports for completeness and credibility, and, when necessary, collects or obtains additional information. Assists in the enforcement and application of consequences, as determined by the State, resulting from confirmed end use violations.

C8.6.2.2.3.3. State (PM/RSAT) serves as the primary USG authority for responding to reports of potential end use violations, communicating to DoD the State investigation status of and other information related to potential end use violations. Receives potential end use violations and conducts investigations. In coordination with the diplomatic and security cooperation communities, determines the actions to be taken, if any, by the USG to address findings in the investigation reports. As necessary, reports findings to Congress.

C8.6.3. End Use Monitoring Investigation Visits and Special End Use Monitoring Checks. The SCO may be required to provide additional information to assist with the investigation process, and special EUM checks may be required to determine the country’s compliance with the transfer agreements. The purpose of an EUM Investigation Visit is to examine possible violations of AECA Section 3 (22 U.S.C. 2753), Foreign Assistance Act (FAA), Section 505 (22 U.S.C. 2314), and any applicable diplomatic notes or agreements regarding the defense articles. These visits may be prompted by intelligence reports and/or other sources that indicate a partner nation may be using U.S.-origin defense articles and services in ways that do not comply with U.S. laws and policies. EUM Investigation Visits are conducted as expeditiously as possible within the required coordination for foreign travel. Due to the unique nature and political sensitivity associated with this type of visit, each EUM Investigation Visit is handled on a case-by-case basis in concert with State.

C8.7.1. In accordance with the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA), Section 505 (22 U.S.C. 2314); Arms Export Control Act (AECA) Section 3 (22 U.S.C. 2753); and the Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) Standard Terms and Conditions, foreign governments may not transfer title to or possession of any defense articles or services to anyone not an officer, employee, or agent (defined as freight forwarder only) of that country or of the USG until the country receives prior written consent from the USG. Nor may the foreign government use or permit the use of such articles or services for purposes other than for which they were furnished unless the foreign government receives prior written consent from the USG. The Security Cooperation Organizations (SCOs) should be aware of the pertinent agreements with the recipient country including any special diplomatic notes or agreements that apply to the defense articles involved. SCOs should contact their DSCA Country Portfolio Director (CPD) to ensure that they have all pertinent agreements.

C8.7.2. Third Party Transfer Responsibilities.

C8.7.2.1. Department of State. The Department of State (State) is responsible for authorizing Third Party Transfers (TPTs) of U.S.-origin defense articles and/or services worldwide.

C8.7.2.1.1. Office of Regional Security and Arms Transfer Policy. Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Office of Regional Security and Arms Transfers (State (PM/RSAT)) is responsible for coordinating the State response for requests to transfer defense articles to a third party, including all associated components, technical data, training, and services originally acquired via Foreign Military Sales (FMS) or grant programs (e.g., Foreign Military Financing (FMF), P.L. 109-163, Military Assistance Program (MAP), Excess Defense Articles (EDA), Drawdown) and requests for the demilitarization and disposal of the items. See the State web page at https://www.state.gov/key-topics-office-of-regional-security-and-arms-transfers/ for additional information.

C8.7.2.1.2. Directorate of Defense Trade Controls. Department of State Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (State (PM/DDTC)) Pursuant to AECA, section 38 (22 U.S.C. 2778) and the International Traffic In Arms Regulations (ITAR) (22 C.F.R. 120-130), State (PM/DDTC) is responsible for processing requests to transfer defense articles or services originally acquired under a commercial export license or other commercial authorization (such as manufacturing license or technical assistance agreements). See ITAR Section 123.9. for additional information. State (PM/DDTC) also authorizes temporary imports of defense articles into the United States.

C8.7.2.2. Department of Justice. The Department of Justice’s (DoJ’s) Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (BATFE) is responsible for control of the permanent import of U.S. Munitions List (USML) (22 C.F.R. 121.1) items into the United States. State approval of a retransfer request by a foreign government must precede and be separate from submission by the importer of an ATF Form 6 import license application to BATFE.

C8.7.2.3. Security Cooperation Organizations. SCOs are directly involved only in actions related to retransfers of items received through DoD-administered programs. They do not process requests for retransfers of defense articles procured by commercial means. Owning countries make such requests directly to State (PM/DDTC) through their embassies in Washington, D.C.

C8.7.3. Third Party Transfer Requests: Government-To-Government. The USG requires recipients of U.S.-origin defense articles, services, or technical data to obtain written consent from State (PM/RSAT) prior to transfer, disposal, or change of end use of its U.S.-origin articles, services, or data. Such approval is required for all transfers, changes of end use, or changes of destination not previously authorized in the original acquisition. Included are defense articles and technical data obtained through FMS, MAP, or EDA programs. TPT decisions are made on a case-by-case basis and are guided by general criteria and specific TPT requirements of arms transfer law, regulations, and policies. See Section C8.7.2.2. and Section C8.7.2.3. The information required for the Standard Questionnaire is provided in Table C8.T7. See State PM/RSAT’s TPT page for step-by-step instructions and an example of a completed questionnaire. Divesting governments may send TPT requests directly to the TPT Team in State (PM/RSAT) (PM_RSAT-TPT@state.gov), through their embassies, or through the SCOs. Working through the SCOs is highly encouraged. However, State (PM/RSAT) is currently making the transition to an online web-based application within the Security Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP), which will receive and track TPT requests. Divesting governments are highly encouraged to utilize SCIP for their submissions, as State (PM/RSAT) intends to eliminate the paper TPT (i.e., receipt and processing of cases via email) entirely by January 2018 or soon thereafter. To register for an account, users must complete a SCIP Registration Form and send it to SCIP admin, requesting access to the State community as "Creator" at https://scip.dsca.mil/. SCIP help/support can be found on the tab within the account. After the transfer is complete, the SCO should upload to the SCIP-EUM module all pertinent documents. If the transfer involves Enhanced End Use Monitoring (EEUM)-designated items, the SCO must contact the End Use Monitoring (EUM) Help Desk to update the EEUM baseline for the partner nations involved in the TPT.

C8.7.3.1. End Use, Retransfer, and Security Assurances. State requires end use, retransfer, and security assurances from the proposed recipient’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) unless the proposed recipient is a member of the Blanket Assurance Program. See Section C8.7.3.2. The assurances must be obtained by the divesting government and submitted with the retransfer request. These assurances are mandatory, generally non-negotiable, and must be received by State before the transfer can be considered for approval. Assurances must be typed in English and signed by an official of the proposed recipient country who can legally bind the entire government (usually the MFA). If the government issues assurances signed by an official of a ministry other than the MFA, such as the Ministry of Defense, the U.S. Embassy in that country must confirm in writing that his or her signature is binding. When language is supplied that does not appear to meet U.S. requirements, the State (PM/RSAT) TPT team coordinates with the Department’s legal counsel to determine whether the language will be accepted. If the language is deemed unacceptable, State (PM/RSAT) will not process the case.

C8.7.3.2. Blanket Assurances. Governments may sign blanket end use, retransfer, and security assurances to satisfy legislative requirements for future government-to-government retransfers. Governments that sign Blanket Assurances are not required to sign individual assurances to receive USG-origin defense articles from foreign governments. Blanket members under the Defense Trade Security Initiative (DTSI) (https://www.state.gov/third-party-transfer-process-and-documentation/#enduse) program have the added benefit of limited advanced USG consent. Members can transfer between and among themselves when: the original acquisition value of all transferred articles does not exceed $7 million; classified defense articles (including classified technical information) are not being transferred; the defense articles to be transferred are already in the inventory of the proposed recipient (no first introduction); and the proposed recipient is either an approved DTSI country (North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members, Japan, Australia, or Sweden) or a signatory to the standard blanket assurance program. DTSI assurances, like blanket assurances, apply only to government-to-government TPTs of USG-origin defense articles. DTSI assurances do not replace the DSP 83 currently used for the retransfer of defense articles originally acquired through Direct Commercial Sales (DCS). Requests for retransfer of DCS-acquired items continue to be reviewed on a case-by-case basis by the State (PM/DDTC). Governments interested in participating in DTSI should contact State (PM/RSAT) for further information.

C8.7.4. Third Party Transfer Requests Government-to-Non-States or Private Entities. As stated in the FAA and AECA, defense articles and defense services are transferred to foreign governments and international organizations to promote U.S. foreign policy objectives. Following the receipt of a request to transfer U.S.-origin defense articles and defense services from a foreign government or international organization, State adjudicates all requests for transfer of U.S.-origin military equipment to non-states, including private entities, nongovernmental organizations, international organizations, and other non-state groups, on a case-by-case basis. In submitting a government-to-non-state transfer request, the divesting country and the SCO follow the same instructions as provided above in Section C8.7.3. and Table C8.T7. For retransfers to private entities, the request should include end use, retransfer, and security assurances from the proposed private entity recipient, as well as Country Over Private Entity (COPE) assurances from the government with legal jurisdiction over the private entity. The written transfer request should include contact details for a representative of the private entity. If a prime contractor is listed specifically on the LOA and is confirmed to be contracted by the USG in order to directly support and provide services to the USG on that FMS case, then a TPT request may not be required. DSCA (Office of International Operations (IOPS)) and State (PM/RSAT) will coordinate to identify the contractor in an LOA note.

C8.7.5. Congressional Requirements for Third Party Transfer. As provided in the FAA and the AECA, certain TPTs of defense articles, including all associated components, technical data, training, and services originally acquired via FMS or grant programs, are subject to congressional notification and reporting requirements.

C8.7.5.1. Congressional Notification. TPTs of defense articles and services originally acquired via FMS or grant programs are subject to requirements for congressional certification pursuant to AECA, Section 3(d) (22 U.S.C. 2753(d)) using certification thresholds similar to those for AECA, Section 36(b) (22 U.S.C. 2776(b)) notifications. See Table C5.T13. and Table C5.T16. A 30-day prior congressional certification is required for TPT requests that involve defense articles and services with original acquisition values that fall in one of the following categories: Major Defense Equipment (MDE) with an acquisition value equal to or greater than $14M for non-NATO recipients and $25M if the recipient is a member of NATO, Australia, Israel, Japan, the Republic of Korea, or New Zealand; or any other defense article or related training or defense service with an acquisition value of $50M or more for non-NATO recipients and $100M or more if the recipient is a member of NATO, Australia, Israel, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and New Zealand. For all recipients, approval is granted after the 30-day calendar day period has expired unless Congress enacts a joint resolution of disapproval.

C8.7.5.2. Transfers pursuant to arrangements among NATO members, or between NATO and any of its member countries for lead-nation procurement are exempt from AECA, Section 3(d) (22 U.S.C. 2753(d)) certification requirements if the defense article to be transferred was originally purchased from the United States, and the transferee on whose behalf the lead-nation procurement was proposed identified to Congress in a notification pursuant to AECA, Section 36(b) (22 U.S.C. 2776(b)). Information as to possible subsequent transfers by a NATO member country purchasing on behalf of a third NATO party shall be provided to DSCA for inclusion in AECA, Section 36(b) (22 U.S.C. 2776(b)) notifications. The certification requirement of AECA, Section 3(d) (22 U.S.C. 2753(d)) also does not apply to the following:

C8.7.6. Congressional Reporting. All approved TPTs involving defense articles and services with an original acquisition value of $1 million or more are submitted in a quarterly report to Congress (AECA, Section 36(a)(9) (22 U.S.C. 2776)).

C8.8.1. Changes in End Use. Requests to change the end use of U.S.-origin defense articles follow the same process and require the same information as Third Party Transfers (TPTs). Changes in end use may include transfers to non-defense uses by other agencies of the owning government, or demilitarization for museum display. Disposal also constitutes a change in end use for which prior consent from Department of State (State) is required for non-consumable items. Cannibalization is viewed as disposal only if the parts being removed will no longer be under the control of the ministry or agency that owns them or will be used for purposes other than for national defense.

C8.8.2. End Use Monitoring and the Disposal Process. End Use Monitoring (EUM) of demilitarization is a key aspect of disposal due to the potential for unauthorized disclosure of classified or sensitive information, safety concerns, and other factors. During disposal, items often move from operating units to holding areas, where personnel may not be aware of classified features, potential lethality, or other sensitivities. Security Cooperation Organizations (SCOs) are responsible for maintaining personnel trained in demilitarization procedures (by completing the Demilitarization Certifier/Verifier Course) and must ensure that DoD demilitarization procedures are followed by the partner nations unless State has specifically authorized or required some other disposition. SCOs will witness the demilitarization and disposal of all Enhanced End Use Monitoring (EEUM)-designated and classified defense articles and will witness or otherwise verify through partner nation reports or other legitimate documentation the demilitarization and disposal of all other defense articles. SCOs should record demilitarization actions by uploading to the Security Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP)-EUM database a copy of the completed Demilitarization Certificate. A sample format of the demilitarization certificate can be found in Department of Defense Manual 4160.28, Volume 2 "Defense Demilitarization: Demilitarization Procedures.”

C8.8.3. Department of Defense Demilitarization Program Office. The DoD Demilitarization Program Office (DDPO) manages the DoD Demilitarization Program to ensure that policy, procedures, program implementation, and operational performance are consistent with U.S. Foreign Policy, National Security objectives and DoD interest. Demilitarization involves eliminating the functional capabilities and/or inherent military design features from DoD personal property. This procedure is required to prevent property from being used for its originally intended purpose, and thereby prevent unauthorized use, and to prevent the release of inherent design information that could be used against the United States and its allies. The methods and degree of demilitarization can range from removal and destruction of critical features to total destruction. Items to be used for purposes of static display require minimum and limited demilitarization to render such items unserviceable in the interest of public safety. This demilitarization will preserve the intrinsic, historical, or display value of the property, but it usually does not constitute complete demilitarization as required for final disposition.

C8.8.4. At the time the partner nation requests State consent to dispose defense articles, the SCO should begin working with partner nation counterparts to develop a demilitarization plan to ensure compliance with DoD demilitarization requirements. The SCO determines the appropriate demilitarization coding assignment in the DoD Manual 4160.28 Volume 2 "Defense Demilitarization: Demilitarization Procedures” or by obtaining the National Stock Number (NSN) from the Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA), 1000 Report or partner nation equipment manual; and accessing (WebFLIS or the Pub Log) at: https://www.dla.mil, to determine the assigned demilitarization code. If the item needs to be demilitarized, the proper procedures are described in DoDM 4160.28 Volume 2 "Defense Demilitarization: Demilitarization Procedures” or by contacting the appropriate Military Department (MILDEP) demilitarization program administrator.” The Certifier and Verifier course website for online training can be found at: https://www.dla.mil/Working-With-DLA/Federal-and-International-Cataloging/DEMIL-Coding/DEMIL-Training/.

C8.8.5. Demilitarization of communications security (COMSEC) products must be conducted by a National Security Agency (NSA) approved COMSEC demilitarization/destruction facility. Service Implementing Agencies (IAs) will utilize their service COMSEC authority disposition guidance for demilitarization of COMSEC products via Foreign Military Sales (FMS). COMSEC products procured/transferred via FMS must be returned and demilitarized via FMS.

C8.8.5.1. Only NSA is authorized to demilitarize "S" type COMSEC products.