Not later than 30 days prior to visit

DSCA/Policy, Plans, and Programs Directorate transmit a Country/Theater Clearance Message in accordance with Foreign Travel Guidance. This message is coordinated with the DSCA Regional Director and identifies major topics to be discussed.

Upon receipt of Country/Theater clearance message (Event #1)

SAO acknowledges confirmation for the Familiarization Visit and identifies points of contact (POC) for each subject to be discussed.

SAO ascertains if the visit will be limited to U.S. members only or if host nation participation is warranted.

15 days prior to visit

SAO finalizes itinerary with DSCA/Policy, Plans and Programs Directorate and, if applicable, the host nation.

SAO finalizes requirements for the visit, confirms entry information for each site to be visited, and assures that affected unit commanders have received the required authorization and understand the nature and purpose of the visit.

Familiarization Visit

SAO ensures someone is at the airport to assist the EUM Familiarization Visit participants when requested by the team.

An SAO representative meets with visit participants upon arrival at the hotel and/or duty location, if required.

Each Familiarization Visit must include the following:

1. Meeting with EUM Familiarization Visit Team members and the U.S. country team
2. Meeting with EUM Familiarization Visit Team members and the host nation (if applicable)
3. Update of Golden Sentry Program by DSCA
4. Discussions regarding type and quantity of enhanced EUM articles transferred to the host nation
5. Discussions regarding SAO and host nation's current compliance with EUM requirements
6. Discussions regarding development of a compliance plan commensurate with the SAO's unique manning
7. Discussions regarding possibility for a future Tiger Team Visit
8. Site visits if required
9. Out-briefing for US country team and host nation as appropriate

While the Familiarization Visit is not intended for accomplishing physical inventories or compliance verification, the EUM Familiarization Visit Team may observe problems during the visit that must be addressed immediately. If during the Familiarization Visit evidence of a possible AECA Section 3 or FAA Section 505 violation is uncovered, see Event #5. If the Familiarization Visit does not uncover any evidence of an AECA Section 3 or FAA Section 505 violation, see Event #6.

Immediately upon discovery of a potential AECA Section 3 or FAA Section 505 violation

The EUM Familiarization Team notifies the SAO and country-team with details about the potential violation.

The EUM Familiarization Team notifies the Director, Policy, Plans, and Programs Directorate with details about the potential violation and SAO/country-team response.

If there is a possible violation, the Policy, Plans, and Programs Director, in coordination with the appropriate Regional Director and the U.S. Department of State, will prepare talking points to be used by the country-team to :

1. notify the host nation of the possible violation and
2. request that the host nation respond to the issue within 30 days.

If the host nation's response and subsequent assessments confirm the potential violation, DSCA formally forwards information regarding the potential violation to the U.S. Department of State for appropriate action.

No later than 15 days after return to CONUS

DSCA EUM lead provides back brief to DSCA/Policy, Plans and Programs and Regional Directorates.

DSCA EUM lead prepares an after action report for distribution to DSCA, the SAO, and the Unified Command.

180 days prior to the visit

DSCA/Policy, Plans, and Programs Directorate transmits an EUM Advisory to the SAO and their respective Unified Combatant Commands to notify them of an impending EUM Tiger Team visit with possible EUM items of interest. This message is coordinated with the appropriate DSCA Regional Director or Acting Director.

Upon receipt of the Advisory (see Event #1)

SAO notifies U.S. country team and the Host Nation of the impending EUM Tiger Team Visit.

SAO confirms receipt of the advisory message and provides DSCA/Policy, Plans, and Programs Directorate a tentative listing of Enhanced EUM items to be reviewed by the Tiger Team.

90 days prior to the visit

DSCA/Policy, Plans, and Programs Directorate, in coordination with the DSCA Regional Directorate, recommends to the SAO the list of defense articles/services to be evaluated by the upcoming EUM Tiger Team Visit.

70-89 days prior to visit

In accordance with the Security Assistance Management Manual, Chapter 8, the SAO should be aware of all Letters of Offer and Acceptance (LOAs) for assigned countries and any special security or accountability notes included in those documents. Based on the recommended list of items provided by DSCA, the SAO will review these LOAs and/or other appropriate transfer documents for unique physical security and accountability notes or special provisos.

If the SAO requires additional information regarding serial numbers, LOAs, etc., they should contact the Military Departments for assistance at this time.

SAO determines the location of the articles within the host nation.

SAO develops a tentative itinerary for the upcoming visit.

70 days prior to visit

SAO provides feedback to DSCA/Policy, Plans, and Programs Directorate on the following:

1. Any U.S. country-team concerns.
2. The SAO representative on the Tiger Team.
3. Unified Command Tiger Team members (if desired by the Unified Command).
4. Recommended additions/deletions from the proposed list of items to be evaluated during the visit.
5. Draft itinerary based on the locations of the items within the host nation.
6. The SAO's last inventory list(s) for the item(s) to be reviewed complete with serial numbers.

60 days prior to visit

DSCA/Policy, Plans, and Programs Directorate issues an Announcement message that:

1. Identifies the Tiger Team members.
2. Confirms the list of defense articles and/or services that will be evaluated during the Tiger Team Visit and their physical location(s).
3. Provides the commodity checklist for each item to be assessed (Example - See Attachment 4 for Enhanced EUM article checklist for Stinger missiles).

Not later than 30 days prior to visit

DSCA/Policy, Plans, and Programs Directorate transmits a Country/Theater Clearance Message in accordance with Foreign Travel Guidance. This message is coordinated with the DSCA Regional Directorate and will cover any in-country support requirements (e.g., transportation). Any changes to information provided in the Announcement message are identified in the Country/Theater Clearance Message.

Upon receipt of Country/Theater Clearance Message (Event #7)

SAO acknowledges receipt of the message and identifies points of contact (POC) for each area to be evaluated (to include names, phone numbers and email addresses).

SAO conducts final coordination with host nation for site clearance for EUM Tiger Team members.

SAO confirms host nation's preparation for the EUM Tiger Team Visit.

15 days prior to visit

SAO finalizes itinerary with DSCA/Policy, Plans and Programs Directorate and the host nation.

SAO finalizes requirements for the visit with the host nation to:

1. Confirm entry information for each site to be visited.
2. Ensure that affected unit commanders have received the required authorization.
3. Ensure everyone understands the standards of the evaluation (e.g., 100% serial number inventory with containers open; 5% random open containers with remainder container serial number verification; etc.).

Tiger Team Visit

SAO ensures someone is at the airport to assist the EUM Tiger Team participants when requested by the team.

An SAO representative meets with visit participants upon arrival at the hotel and/or duty location, if required.

Each Tiger Team Visit must include the following:

1. Meeting with EUM Tiger Team members and the U.S. country team.
2. Meeting with EUM Tiger Team members and the host nation.
3. Update of Golden Sentry Program by DSCA.
4. Evaluate SAO and host nation's current compliance with EUM requirements.
5. Review the records for the specific items identified in the Announcement message (Event #6).
6. Conduct site visits to evaluate facility physical security and accountability procedures for the locations identified in the Announcement message (Event #6)
7. Out-briefings for US country team and host nation. Preliminary observations and findings will be discussed.

If the EUM Tiger Team is unable to complete the visit for any reason, see Event #11.

If during the Tiger Team Visit evidence of a possible AECA Section 3 or FAA Section 505 violation is uncovered, see Event #12.

If the EUM Tiger Team Visit does not uncover any evidence of an AECA Section 3 or FAA Section 505 violation and is able to be completed, see Event #13.

Immediately upon identification of problems

The DSCA EUM Tiger Team lead notifies the SAO and country-team with details about why they are unable to successfully complete the visit.

The DSCA EUM Tiger Team lead notifies the Director, Policy, Plans, and Programs Directorate with details about the problem precluding a successful visit, and SAO/country team response.

The Policy, Plans and Programs Director, in coordination with the appropriate Regional Director, will determine appropriate course of action and notify the EUM Tiger Team lead during the visit.

After return to CONUS, the EUM Tiger Team lead will work with the Regional Directorate to develop a follow-up course of action as required.

Immediately upon discovery of a potential AECA Section 3 or FAA Section 505 violation

The EUM Tiger Team notifies the SAO and country-team with details about the potential violation.

The EUM Tiger Team notifies the Director, Policy, Plans, and Programs Directorate with details about the potential violation and SAO/country-team response.

If there is a possible violation, the Policy, Plans, and Programs Director, in coordination with the appropriate Regional Director and the U.S. Department of State, will prepare talking points to be used by the country-team to:

1. notify the host nation of the possible violation and
2. request that the host nation respond to the issue within 30 days.

If the host nation's response and subsequent assessments confirm the potential violation, DSCA formally forwards information regarding the potential violation to the U.S. Department of State for appropriate action.

No later than 15 days after the visit

DSCA EUM Tiger Team lead provides back brief to DSCA/Policy, Plans and Programs and Regional Directorates.

DSCA EUM Tiger Team lead prepares Interim Team After-Action Report (TAR) and distributes to DSCA, the SAO, and the other EUM Tiger Team members for coordination and comment. (See attachment 5 for TAR format.)

Upon receipt of Interim TAR (no later than 20 days after the visit)

SAO reviews Interim TAR and provides input to the DSCA EUM Tiger Team lead.

EUM Tiger Team members review Interim TAR and provide input to the DSCA Tiger Team lead.

Upon receipt of comments (no later than 25 days after the visit)

DSCA EUM Tiger Team lead prepares Final TAR.

Final TAR is approved by the Director, DSCA and sent to the Commander of the appropriate Unified Combatant Command.

Note the LOA requires 2 high security padlocks, but U.S. regulations require one with a second low to medium security padlock in lieu of a second high security padlock. Make note of which method the host nation is using.

1. Does the SAO have a copy of the LOA which contracted the sale of the Stinger Missiles and MANPADS components?
2. Does the SAO have a copy of all the serial numbers and model numbers for Stinger missiles and grip stocks sold to the host country? If not what actions has the SAO taken to obtain the list?
3. Has the SAO read and understand the security requirements as indicated in the LOA for the Stinger missiles and grip stocks? If understanding is not complete, what actions has the SAO taken to resolve any questions?
4. Has an inventory of all serial numbers of Stinger missiles and grip stocks been conducted within the last 12 months by matching the serial numbers on the known list with the serial numbers on the MANPAD component or from the outside of its sealed container? If not what are the reasons?
5. Were all serial numbers accounted for? If not was a report of the loss provided by the SAO/host nation (as appropriate) and forwarded to the Army and DSCA?
6. Were there indications of intrusion to the box/container or compromise of the items? A. Wire lead/aluminum seal broken on the container or box B. Humidity indicator a light, medium or dark pink C. Lighter than normal weight of boxes/containers D. Lack of serial numbers on the outside of the box
7. Was the container opened and the physical serial number presence of the MANPADS components verified if any of the indictors of intrusion or compromise to the container found?
8. Did the SAO, review the recipient government's records of monthly, quarterly, and/or semi-annual two-man verifications? If they were not available what was the reason?
9. Does the SAO have a copy of the last serial number inventory on file?
10. What were the actions taken to correct discrepancies noted in the last inventory and last observations of physical security deficiencies?

1. Did the US Army notify the SAO when delivery of the missiles began?
2. Were serial numbers provided to the SAO for missiles and grip stocks, shipped to and received by the foreign government?
3. Did the SAO conduct the first physical inventory within 30 days after the US Army notified the SAO of final delivery of missiles? If not explain.

Were the following security requirements taken from the LOA complied with?

1. Guards - Is there a full time guard force?
2. Fencing - Chain link fence 6ft high with a 1 foot slanted barbed wire overhang at the top. Real estate permitting, 12ft free zone outside the fence & 30 ft inside.
3. Is lighting provided to illuminate the magazine/arms room/vault door during the hours of darkness or reduced visibility? Is lighting provided along the
4. Building/magazine - The requirement is for a reinforced concrete, arch type, earth covered magazine. Storage in other types of structures may be permitted if the structure used would provide the same time delay equivalent as the earth covered magazine or igloo.
5. Door of Class V steel vault specifications - Steel used on these doors is approximately twice the thickness of a good steel wall locker. It should be of double wall construction with reinforcing in between. If should not be easy to open with an axe of other such cutting tool.
6. Shrouded Hasps used for the high-security padlocks - Hasps which have a heavy metal cover over and around the top of the hasp which when in place prevents easy access to the cutting of the pad lock's shank.
7. 2 High-security Pad Locks must be used that are operated by key.
8. 2 person Key Control - Are two persons required to open the door and are they continuously present? Lock & key procedures need to be in place to insure no single person can obtain access to the storage site.
   
   EXAMPLE OF QUESTIONS TO ASK TO DETERMINE IF A GOOD LOCK & KEY PROCEDURE IS IN PLACE:
   Is a key/lock inventory list being maintained which depicts a list of all keys/locks, key/lock serial numbers, and the number of keys maintained for each lock?
   Do all keys have a serial number stamped or inscribed on them?
   Are master keyed or multiple keyed systems used (not allowed?)?
   Is the key depository located in a room where it is kept under 24-hour surveillance around-the-clock or in a room that can be (and is) locked during non-duty hours?
   Is each person of the two person team necessary to open the doors kept on separate rosters and allowed to have access to only one each of the two keys necessary to open the door (secured by two different hi-security pad locks)?
9. Seals on containers/boxes intact?
10. Is the intrusion detection system (IDS) or closed circuit television operational, or is the magazine/arms room/vault under 24-hour surveillance by a guard?
11. Were compensatory measures used or considered when full compliance with the LOA security measures not met? If so what were the compensatory measures?
12. If all security requirements are not to standard has a request for exception/waiver regarding structural or security deficiencies been submitted if required? If a waiver/exception has been granted, is it available and reviewed as required, and is the unit complying with any required compensatory measures?

Make a special note for Army if any structure other than an earth covered magazine or igloo is used. Beyond the security issue of using other structures, there could be an explosive safety issue.

1. Are grip stocks stored in an enclosed room, with a metal door or metal covered solid wood door, and two padlocks? Door hinges on the inside? Windows barred? Is there security lighting over the door?
2. Is there controlled access to the keys and entry to the storage facility?
3. Are the grips stocks secured in a metal secondary container inside the room? If the container with grip stocks inside weighs less than 500lbs is it secured to the floor or walls with chain and locks?

Mandatory for LOAs for sales of MANPADS to NATO, NATO Nations, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand.

"Purchaser agrees to adhere to the following additional security requirements associated with [insert appropriate missile/system]. The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DAMO-ODL-S), U.S. Army may approve modification of specified requirements to meet indigenous conditions.

1. Physical Security. The [insert appropriate missile] will be stored in magazines that are at least equivalent in strength to U.S. Army requirements as specified in subparagraph (1) below. The purchaser also agrees to comply with U.S. Army specified requirements for lighting, doors, locks, keys, fencing, and surveillance and guard systems. Specific requirements will be agreed upon and installed prior to delivery of the missile system. U.S. Army representatives will be allowed to verify security measures and procedures established for implementation of these requirements.
   1. Magazines. Reinforced concrete, arch type, earth covered whose construction is at least equivalent in strength to the requirements of Chapter 5, DoD 6055.9-STD, "Ammunition and Explosive Safety Standards," July 1984, will be used for storage (standards of which will be provided to the purchaser).
   2. Lighting. Lighting will be provided for exterior doors and along perimeter barriers. Security lighting requirements will conform to the ammunition and safety requirements of U.S. Army Technical Manual 9-1300-206, Appendix C (standards of which will be provided to the purchaser).
   3. Doors, Locks, and Keys. Exterior doors will be class five steel vault doors secured by two key-operated high security padlocks and a high security shrouded hasp. Keys will be secured separately to ensure effective two-man control of access (i.e., two authorized persons must be present to enter). Use of a master or multiple key system is prohibited.
   4. Fencing. Fencing will be six foot (minimum) steel chain link with a one-foot overhang mounted on steel or reinforced concrete posts over firm base. Clear zones will be established 30 feet inside and 12 feet outside the perimeter fence (provided there is adequate space).
   5. Surveillance and Guard. A full-time guard force or combination guard force and intrusion detection system (IDS) will be provided. When the IDS is not operational, 24-hour guard surveillance is required.
   6. Access to Storage Facilities. Two authorized persons will be required to be present during any activity that affords access to storage facilities containing [insert missile/system]. Lock and key procedures will be developed to ensure that no single individual can obtain unescorted or unobserved access to [insert missile/system] storage facilities.
2. Accountability
   1. A 100 percent physical inventory of [insert items required to be inventoried], when applicable, will be taken monthly by the purchaser. A 100 percent physical inventory by serial number shall be taken quarterly of [insert items] issued at the operational unit level. A 100 percent physical inventory by serial number shall be taken semiannually of [insert items] stored or retained at installation, depot, post, or base level. To ensure verification, two people must conduct all inventories. [Insert items] expended during peacetime will be accounted for by serial number.
   2. The [insert appropriate foreign country SAO] will be permitted to conduct a U.S. inspection and inventory of [insert items] by serial number annually. As appropriate, [insert items] are required to be inventoried annually by physical count. Inventory and accountability records maintained by the purchaser will be made available for review.
3. Transportation. Movements of [insert appropriate missile] will meet U.S. standards for safeguarding classified material in transit as specified by the USG in DoD 5100.76- M (current revision), "Physical Security of Sensitive Conventional Arms, Munitions, and Explosives" (standards of which will be provided to the purchaser), and paragraph h below.
4. Access to Hardware and Classified Information
   1. Access to hardware and related classified information will be limited to military and civilian personnel of the purchasing Government (except for authorized U.S. personnel as specified herein) who have the proper security clearance and who have an established need to know the information in order to perform their duties. Information released will be limited to that necessary to perform assigned responsibility and, where possible, will be oral or visual only.
   2. Maintenance that requires access to the interior of the [insert missile, operational system, etc] beyond that required of the operator, and maintenance or repair that requires access to the interior of the guidance assembly of [insert item(s)] will be performed under U.S. control.
5. Compromise, Loss, Theft, and Unauthorized Use. The purchaser will report through the security assistance office and country team to the DoS by the most expeditious means any instances of compromise, unauthorized use, loss or theft of any [insert missile and any other materiel] or related information. This will be followed by prompt investigation and the results of the investigation will be provided through the same channels.
6. Third-Party Access. The recipient will agree that no information on [insert appropriate missile] will be released to a third-country Government, person or other third-country entity without U.S. approval.
7. Damaged/Expended Materiel. Damaged [insert systems, materiel] will be returned to the U.S. Army for repair or demilitarization.
8. Conditions of Shipment and Storage for [insert missile system]. Principal components (missiles and, as applicable, gripstocks or launchers) of the [insert missile system and any other items requiring separate storage] will be stored in at least two separate locations and will be shipped [insert how; e.g., in separate containers, separately]. The storage locations will be physically separated sufficiently so that a penetration of the security at one site will not place other sites at risk.
9. Conditions of Use. Assembly of the system will not be permitted for field exercises or deployments wherein the use of the [insert appropriate missile] system is simulated. In such cases, inert training devices may be used. The recipient will use information on the [insert appropriate missile] only for the purpose for which it was given."

Mandatory for LOAs for sales of MANPADS to purchasers other than NATO, NATO Nations, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand.

"Purchaser agrees to adhere to the following additional security requirements associated with [insert appropriate missile/system]. Modification of specified requirements to meet indigenous conditions may be approved by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DAMO-ODL-S), U.S. Army.

1. Physical Security. The [insert appropriate missile] will be stored in magazines that are at least equivalent in strength to U.S. Army requirements as specified in subparagraph (1) below. The purchaser also agrees to comply with U.S. Army specified requirements for lighting, doors, locks, keys, fencing, and surveillance and guard systems. Specific requirements will be agreed upon and installed prior to delivery of the missile system. U.S. Army representatives will be allowed to verify security measures and procedures established for implementation of these requirements.
   1. Magazines. Reinforced concrete, arch type, earth covered whose construction is at least equivalent in strength to the requirements of Chapter 5, DoD 6055.9-STD, "Ammunition and Explosive Safety Standards," July 1999, will be used for storage (standards of which will be provided to the purchaser).
   2. Lighting. Lighting will be provided for exterior doors and along perimeter barriers. Security lighting requirements will conform to the ammunition and safety requirements of U.S. Army Technical Manual 9-1300-206, Appendix C (standards of which will be provided to the purchaser).
   3. Doors, Locks, and Keys. Exterior doors will be class five steel vault doors secured by two key-operated high security padlocks and a high security shrouded hasp. Keys will be secured separately to ensure effective two-man control of access (i.e., two authorized persons must be present to enter). Use of a master or multiple key system is prohibited.
   4. Fencing. Fencing will be six foot (minimum) steel chain link with a one-foot overhang mounted on steel or reinforced concrete posts over firm base. Clear zones will be established 30 feet inside and 12 feet outside the perimeter fence (provided there is adequate space).
   5. Surveillance and Guard. A full-time guard force or combination guard force and intrusion detection system (IDS) will be provided. When the IDS is not operational, 24-hour guard surveillance is required.
   6. Access to Storage Facilities. Two authorized persons will be required to be present during any activity that affords access to storage facilities containing [insert missile/system]. Lock and key procedures will be developed to ensure that no single individual can obtain unescorted or unobserved access to [insert missile/system] storage facilities.
2. Accountability
   1. Each month, the purchaser will take a 100 percent physical inventory of [insert items required to be inventoried], when applicable. A 100 percent physical inventory by serial number shall be taken quarterly of [insert items] issued at the operational unit level. A 100 percent physical inventory by serial number shall be taken semiannually of [insert items] stored or retained at installation, depot, post, or base level. To ensure verification, two people must conduct all inventories. [Insert items] expended during peacetime will be accounted for by serial number.
   2. The [insert appropriate foreign country SAO] will be permitted to conduct a U.S. inspection and inventory of [insert items] by serial number annually. As appropriate, [insert items] are required to be inventoried annually by physical count. Inventory and accountability records maintained by the purchaser will be made available for review.
3. Transportation. Movements of [insert appropriate missile] will meet U.S. standards for safeguarding classified material in transit as specified by the USG in DoD 5100.76-M (current revision), "Physical Security of Sensitive Conventional Arms, Munitions, and Explosives" (standards of which will be provided to the purchaser), and paragraph h below.
4. Access to Hardware and Classified Information.
   1. Access to hardware and related classified information will be limited to military and civilian personnel of the purchaser (except for authorized U.S. personnel as specified herein) who have the proper security clearance and who have an established need to know the information in order to perform their duties. Information released will be limited to that necessary to perform assigned responsibility and, where possible, will be oral or visual only.
   2. Maintenance that requires access to the interior of the [insert missile, operational system, etc.] beyond that required of the operator, and maintenance or repair that requires access to the interior of the guidance assembly of [insert item(s)] will be performed under U.S. control.
5. Compromise, Loss, Theft, and Unauthorized Use. The purchaser will report through the security assistance office and country team to the DoS by the most expeditious means any instances of compromise, unauthorized use, loss or theft of any [insert missile and any other materiel] or related information. This will be followed by prompt investigation and the results of the investigation will be provided through the same channels.
6. Third-Party Access. The recipient will agree that no information on [insert appropriate missile] will be released to a third-country Government, person or other third-country entity without U.S. approval.
7. Damaged/Expended Materiel. Damaged [insert systems, materiel] will be returned to the U.S. Army for repair or demilitarization.
8. Conditions of Shipment and Storage for [insert missile system]. Principal components (missiles and, as applicable, gripstocks or launchers) of the [insert missile system and any other items requiring separate storage] will be stored in at least two separate locations and will be shipped [insert how; e.g., in separate containers, separately]. The storage locations will be physically separated sufficiently so that a penetration of the security at one site will not place other sites at risk.
9. Conditions of Use.
   1. The two principle components of the [insert appropriate missile system and any other items] may be brought together and assembled under the following circumstances:
      1. In the event of hostilities or imminent hostilities.
      2. For firing as part of regularly scheduled training; however, only those rounds to be fired will be withdrawn from storage and assembled.
      3. For lot testing; however, only rounds to be tested will be withdrawn from storage and assembled.
      4. When systems are deployed as part of the point defenses of high priority installations or activities (e.g., key Government buildings, military headquarters, essential utilities, air defense facilities).
   2. The purchaser will advise the U.S. Security Assistance Organization in advance of any assembly of the various missile and [insert any other items] for the [insert appropriate missile] for training or lot testing.
   3. The U.S. Government will be notified of deployments through the Security Assistance Organization."

Todays Date:

Country:

Start Date:

Return Date:

Satisfactory

Yes/No

Need Improvement

Yes/No

Unsatisfactory

Yes/No