Superseded
This policy memo has been superseded by the 2012 SAMM Rewrite.
This policy memo had partially superseded DSCA 04-11.
DEFENSE SECURITY COOPERATION AGENCY | 3/29/2005 | |
MEMORANDUM FOR :
SEE DISTRIBUTION
SUBJECT :
Golden Sentry End-Use Monitoring (EUM) STINGER Missile and Gripstock Inventory Standardized Procedures (DSCA Policy Memorandum 05-10)
REFERENCE :
- Golden Sentry End-Use Monitoring (EUM) Visit Policy (DSCA Policy Memorandum 04-11)
DSCA Policy Memorandum 04-11, 2 April 2004, delineated EUM visit responsibilities in support of the Golden Sentry End-Use Monitoring (EUM) program. This policy was incorporated into Chapter 8 of the Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM). In-country visits to assess and evaluate EUM compliance programs are an important part of the Golden Sentry program and will continue for the foreseeable future with an emphasis on Stinger missile and grip stock accountability. Attached to Policy Memorandum 04-11 was a DRAFT Stinger checklist. Since publication of that memorandum in April 2004, the EUM team conducted two Tiger Team visits to Greece and Bahrain validating the checklist.
This memorandum replaces the former DRAFT checklist with the validated checklist and provides more refined procedures for Stinger Missile and grip stock inspection requirements. Additionally, this memorandum mandates all USG representatives adhere to the standards within the checklist in the conduct of Stinger missiles and gripstock inventories. This action complies with the recommendations included in GAD's May 2004 report: "Further Improvements Needed in U.S. Efforts to Counter Threats from Man-Portable Air Defense Systems." As Stinger missile and gripstock inspections continue, we will update this checklist as required.
Combatant Commands should include the attached checklist in their EUM Directives/Standard Operating Procedures (SOP)/Guidance. If you have any questions regarding these changes, my point of contact is Ms. Jill R. Fong at (Voice) 703-604-6596 DSN664), (FAX) 703-602-1059 (DSN 332), NIPRNET (unclassified) email address Jill.Fong@dsca.mil, and SIPRNET (classified) e-mail address Jill.Fong@dsca.osd.smil.mil.
Freda J. Lodge
Director
Policy, Plans and Programs
ATTACHMENT :
EUM Stinger Checklist (April 2004)
CHECKLIST AND GENERAL GUIDANCE FOR STINGER MISSILE/MANPADS END-USE MONITORING COMPLIANCE
PHYSICAL SECURITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY COMPLIANCE FOR STINGER MISSILES/MANPADS TRANSFERS
REFERENCE :
- DoD 5105.38-M "Security Assistance Management Manual"
- DoD 5100.76-M "Physical Security of Sensitive Conventional Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives"
- DoD 4140.1-R "DoD Material Management Regulation"
- AR 190-11 "Physical Security of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives"
- Letter of Offer and Acceptance and other implementing agreements, e.g., MOU/MOA which allow the transfer of MANPADS
INVENTORY AND COMPLIANCE CHECKLIST FOR MANPADS ON HAND OVER 12 MONTHS.
✓ | Item | Remarks |
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| 1. Does the SAO have a copy of the LOA that contracted the sale of the Stinger Missiles and MANPADS components? |
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| 2. Does the SAO have a copy of all the serial numbers and model numbers for Stinger missiles and gripstocks sold to the host country? If not what actions has the SAO taken to obtain the list from the Implementing Agencies? |
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| 3. Has the SAO read and understood the security requirements as indicated in the LOA for the Stinger missiles and gripstocks? If understanding is not complete, what actions has the SAO taken to resolve any questions? |
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| 4. Has an inventory of all serial numbers of Stinger missiles and gripstocks been conducted within the last 12 months by matching the serial numbers on the known list with the serial numbers on the MANPAD component or from the outside of its sealed container? If not what are the reasons? |
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| 5. Were all serial numbers accounted for? If not was a report of the loss provided by the SAO/host nation (as appropriate) and forwarded to the Army and DSCA? |
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| 6. Were there indications of intrusion to the box/container or compromise of the items?
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| 7. If the container is opened, and the serial number of the MANPADS components verified, are there any indicators of intrusion or compromise to the container found in accordance with paragraph 2C? |
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| 8. Did the SAO, review the recipient government's records of monthly, quarterly and/or semi-annual two-man verifications? If they were not available what was the reason? |
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| 9. Does the SAO have a copy of the last serial number inventory on file? |
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| 10. What were the actions taken to correct discrepancies noted in the last inventory and last observations of physical security deficiencies? |
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FOR MANPADS OR COMPONENTS ARRIVED WITHIN THE PAST 12 MONTHS ADD THE FOLLOWING:
✓ | Item | Remarks |
---|---|---|
| 1. Did the US Army notify the SAO when delivery of the missiles began? |
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| 2. Were serial numbers provided to the SAO for missiles and gripstocks, shipped to and received by the foreign government? |
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| 3. Did the SAO conduct the first physical inventory within 30 days after the US Army notified the SAO of delivery of missiles? If not explain. |
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STINGER MISSILES:
✓ | Item | Remarks |
---|---|---|
| SECURITY: This is a CAT 1-missile/explosive, that must be secured and inventoried IAW the following requirements: |
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| A. DEPOT, POST OR INSTALLATION STORAGE-General requirements follow: |
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| 1.) 2 high security padlocks. |
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| 2.) 2-person rule. Each person is authorized on a specific access roster for a specific key only. The same person cannot be on the access roster for both keys. Thus it should require 2 persons to unlock the door. Review the access rosters for compliance. |
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| 3.) Chain link fence 6ft high with a 1 foot slanted barbed wire overhang. |
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| 4.) Real estate permitting; 12ft free zone outside fence & 30ft inside fence. |
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| 5.) Minimum gates. If not guarded, secured with adequate locking devices. Underground drains, etc barred if > 96 sq in. |
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| 6.) Lights. Lights around perimeter and over door must be adequate to detect unauthorized personnel. Light switches must be controlled. |
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| 7.) Storage bunker must have an intrusion detection system (IDS), a closed circuit television, or constant, on site guard with radio/communications with its headquarters. If IDS is used does someone call in before going into the magazine, if not, does a reaction force respond as though this was an unauthorized intrusion? |
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| 8.) Missiles will typically be stored in original containers, sealed and banded together. |
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| B. DEPLOYED UNIT STORAGE-Unit storage is for those missiles, which are deployed in a tactical or operational environment. Storage requirements are much the same as for missiles stored in a depot, but commanders may post a letter in the storage facility that indicates they have chosen for operational reasons to store the missiles in an alternate security location. When this happens the minimum security requirements apply: |
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| 1.) Missile containers/boxes will be banded together in a manner that easily shows signs of tampering. |
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| 2.) Stored in an approved container such as a SEAVAN, MILVAN, or stored in a totally enclosed building. |
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| 3.) Doors must be secured with two padlocks (medium or low security padlocks are okay.) |
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| 4.) Two-person access rule applies. |
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| 5.) Must have 24hrs armed guard surveillance and the guard must have communications with its headquarters. (When these types of storage facilities are used, IDS or closed circuit TV cannot be a substitute for the 24hr armed guard surveillance.) |
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| 6.) Note: MANPADS missiles cannot be left in vehicles, aircraft, or ammunition holding areas. |
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| C. WAIVERS/EXCEPTIONS/COMPENSATORY MEASURES: When compliance is not met, are there any approved waivers, exceptions, or compensatory measures in place? |
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COMPLIANCE INSPECTION OF THE SECURITY FACILITIES AND ARRANGEMENTS USED FOR THE MANPADS MISSILE SECURITY COMPLIANCE CHECKLIST
Note: Make a special note for Army if any structure other than an earth covered magazine or igloo is used. Beyond the security issue of using other structures, there could be an explosive safety issue.
✓ | Item | Remarks |
---|---|---|
| 1. Were the following security requirements taken from the LOA or MOU complied with? |
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| A. Guards-Is there a full time guard force? |
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| B. Fencing- Chain link fence 6ft high with a 1 foot slanted barbed wire overhang at the top. Real estate permitting, 12ft free zone outside the fence & 30ft inside. |
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| C. Is lighting provided to illuminate the magazine/arms room/vault door during the hours of darkness or reduced visibility? Is lighting provided along the perimeter of the fence line for the missile storage area? |
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| D. Building/magazine-The requirement is for a reinforced concrete, arch type, earth covered magazine. Storage in other types of structures may be permitted if the structure used would provide the same time delay equivalent as the earth covered magazine or igloo. |
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| E. Door of Class V steel vault specifications (Photo 1) - Steel used on these doors is approximately twice the thickness of a good steel wall locker. It should be of double wall construction with reinforcing in between. If should not be easy to open with an axe of other such cutting tool. |
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| F. Shrouded Hasps used with high-security padlocks - Hasps which have a heavy metal cover over and around the top of the hasp which when in place prevents easy access to the cutting of the pad lock's shank (Photo 2). |
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| G. Shrouded Hasps used with high-security padlocks - Hasps which have a heavy metal cover over and around the top of the hasp which when in place prevents easy access to the cutting of the pad lock's shank (Photo 2). |
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| H. 2 Hi-security Pad Locks must be used that are operated by key. |
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| I. 2 person Key Control-Are two persons required to open the door and are they continuously present? Lock & key procedures need to be in place to insure no single person can obtain access to the storage site. EXAMPLE OF QUESTIONS TO ASK TO DETERMINE IF A GOOD LOCK & KEY PROCEDURES ARE IN PLACE: . Is a key/lock inventory list being maintained which depicts a list of all keys/locks, key/lock serial numbers and the number of keys maintained for each lock? . Do all keys have a serial number stamped or inscribed on them? . Are master keyed or multiple keyed systems used (not allowed?)? . Is the key depository located in a room where it is kept under 24-hour surveillance around-the-clock or in a room that can be (and is) locked during non-duty hours? . Is each person of the two person team necessary to open the doors kept on separate rosters and allowed to have access to only one each of the two keys necessary to open the door (secured by two different hi-security pad locks?) |
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| J. Seals on containers/boxes intact? |
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| K. Is the intrusion detection system (IDS) or closed circuit television operational, or is the magazine/arms room/vault under 24-hour surveillance by a guard? |
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| L. Were compensatory measures used or considered when full compliance with the LOA security measures not met? If so what were the compensatory measures? (Photo 3). |
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| M. If all security requirements are not to standard has a request for exception/waiver regarding structural or security deficiencies been submitted if required? If a waiver/exception has been granted, is it available and reviewed as required, and is the unit complying with any required compensatory measures? |
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| 2: MISSILE INSPECTION: |
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| A. The missile should be in a metal container or wire bound wooden box (Photos 4 & 5). The box will have the serial number on the outside. |
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| B. Except for missiles deployed to hostile areas, the SAO will physically inventory 100 percent annually of in-country Stinger missiles (by looking within the launch tube), gripstocks, and other essential components, e.g. batteries. The inventory must include review of the recipient's records of monthly two-man verifications as required by the Stinger/MANPADS LOA or other arms transfer document note, e.g. MOU. Unless problems indicate the necessity for such action, the manufacturer's sealed containers should not be opened during the inventory. There must be a manufacturer's seal on at least one of the bent wire closures (wooden box) (Photo 6) or at least one of the metal containers' latches (Photo 7). |
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| C. Signs to look for to see if a missile has been removed from a box and the box returned |
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| 3: TO A PALLET: |
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| A. Manufacturer's banding is not bounding the missile pallets (Photo 8). |
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| B. Look at the ends of the wooden boxes. One will have a window that should show a humidity indicator (Photo 9). The humidity indicator should be blue (Photo 10). If the indicator is missing or cannot be seen or if the indicator shows an unacceptable level of humidity (pink shades of color indicates level of humidity), it is an indication that the missile is missing or that the packaging and desiccant is unserviceable and must be opened and repackaged and desiccant replaced (Photo 11). |
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| C. A method of gaining access to the missile inside of the wooden crate without breaking the wooden crate's seal, is to: a) cut the banding wire of the missile pallet, b) remove a missile container from the pallet, c) cut the bottom of the wooden container, d) remove the missile and launch tube from the bottom of the wooden container (Photo 12), e) repack the remnants into the wooden container, f) put the wooden crate back into the middle of the pallet (Photo 5). |
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| D. Broken seals. Seals are easily broken (Photo 13). If in a wood wire bound box, remove the inner plastic sealed cardboard box from the wooden box and check for cuts or unusual sealing techniques in the sealed wrapping (Photo 14). If it feels and looks original and normal, assume the missile is inside and replace in the wire bound box and reseal with a DSCA approved seal (Photo 15) or label (Photo 16). If it looks questionable or its weight is light, the plastic must be removed and the missile physically inventoried (Photo 12). |
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| E. If in a metal container (Photo 17), check the latches for manufacturers (Photo 7) or DSCA approved seal (Photo 15) or label (Photo 16) and that the humidity indicator is blue (Photo 18). If the seals look original, and the humidity indicator is blue, assume the missile is inside. IF the container looks questionable or its weight is light, the container must be opened and the missile physically inventoried (Photo 19). |
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GRIPSTOCK SECURITY COMPLIANCE CHECKLIST
Note: The grip stock is a Category III weapon. Security requirements are not spelled out in the LOA but customer nations are required to meet the Army's minimum-security requirements.
✓ | Item | Remarks |
---|---|---|
| A. If stored at a Depot: are the gripstocks stored separate from the stinger missiles in an enclosed room? (Photo 20). With a metal door or metal covered solid wood door, and two high security padlocks? Door hinges on the inside? (Photo 3) Windows barred? Is there security lighting over the door? b. If stored in an arms room: are the grips stocks secured in a metal secondary container inside the room? If the container with gripstocks inside weighs less than 500lbs is it secured to the floor or walls with chain and locks? (Photo 21) |
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| B. Is there controlled access to the keys and entry to the storage facility? |
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| C. Are the grips stocks secured in a metal container inside the room? (Photo 22). If not, are the gripstocks in their original packing? (Photo 23). If the packing does not show signs of tampering, do not open. If the packing shows signs of being opened, the gripstock must be visually inventoried (Photo 24) by serial number (Photo 25). |
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MANDATORY NOTES
Note Usage |
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Mandatory Notes For LOAs (Amendments And Modifications) For Sales Of MANPADS To NATO, NATO Nations, Japan, Australia, And New Zealand |
Note Text |
"Purchaser agrees to adhere to the following additional security requirements associated with [insert appropriate missile/system]. The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DAMO-ODL-S), U.S. Army may approve modification of specified requirements to meet indigenous conditions.
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Note Usage |
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Mandatory notes for LOAs (amendments and modifications) for sales of MANPADS to purchasers other than NATO, NATO nations, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand: |
Note Text |
"Purchaser agrees to adhere to the following additional security requirements associated with [insert appropriate missile/system]. Modification of specified requirements to meet indigenous conditions may be approved by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DAMO-ODL-S), U.S. Army.
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DSCA Golden Sentry Enhanced End-Use Monitoring Checklist Images
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