Attachment: Security Assistance Management Manual E-Change 886 
Updates to Missile Technology Control Regime Guidance

1. Update Section C3.7. System-Specific Technology Release Requirements as follows:

   C3.7. - System-Specific Technology Release Requirements.

   C3.7.1. Missile Technology Control Regime. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is an informal and voluntary international political understanding among states that seek to limit the proliferation of missiles and missile technology to include UAS. arrangement designed to control the proliferation of rocket and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) systems and associated equipment and technology capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. Although the regime is a political commitment rather than a treaty with international legal obligation, many countries, including the United States, have passed laws restricting the export of MTCR-controlled items. See Arms Export Control Act (AECA), Chapter 7 (22 U.S.C. 2551).

   C3.7.1.1. Missile Technology Control Regime Screening Process. Regime controls are applicable to all items on the United States Munitions List (USML) annotated with an (MT) per Introduction to the U.S. Munitions List (22 CFR 120.10). The Department of State (State), Department of Commerce (DOC), and DoW each has a role in regulating the export of MTCR-controlled items from the United States. DoW identifies MTCR-controlled items that purchasers have requested via Foreign Military Sales (FMS). To ensure technical reviews are standardized, reviewers must complete a DSCA-approved Missile Technology Proliferation Course. Implementing Agencies (IAs) maintain a roster of personnel trained and/or knowledgeable on MTCR controls to be updated and provided quarterly to DSCA (Office of International Operations, Weapons Directorate (IOPS/WPN)).

   C3.7.1.1.1. Upon receipt of a Letter of Request (LOR), prior to Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) development, the System Program Office (SPO), Program Manager (PM), or equivalent will perform a technical review of each LORLOA to identify MTCR-controlled items contained in the LORLOA or envisioned to be part of the associated program.Upon receipt of an actionable Letter of Request (LOR) for an MTCR Category I UAS, as defined in the MTCR Annex, the Program Office, PM, or equivalent will provide advanced notice via an LOR-Advisory (LOR-A) (no formal memo is required) to the Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Office of Regional Security and Arms Transfers (PM/RSAT) at PM_RSATUAS_Reviews@state.gov, providing the LOR and the following information: End-User, MTCR Category I UAS System Name, and Quantity. Concurrently with DoW review and case development, PM/RSAT will provide the LOR to the Missile Technology Export Control (MTEC) working group for a nonproliferation pre-assessment to inform PM/RSAT's Conventional Arms Transfer (CAT) Policy review. The IA MTCR POC will retain the LOR-Advisory and any Department of State response in the case file and will provide an updated LOR-Advisory when the end user, system configuration, or quantity materially changes before Letter of Offer and Acceptance offer. (Special reporting requirements apply to bulk compounds (Item 4) and fuses (Item 2.A.1.f.))*

   *The reviewer must report the compounds listed in Item 4 of the MTCR Annex if they are to be exported in bulk or in any other manner or form that might support the creation of a propellant for a missile or a UAV. However, the reviewer is not to report Item 4 explosive compounds if they are molded or poured into a form that precludes their use as rocket propellant (e.g., as a bursting, propelling, or gas generating charge in a shell, cartridge, squib, or actuator).

   Even though all fuses meet the criteria of Item 2.A.1.f. in the MTCR Annex (i.e., "weapon or warhead safing, arming, fusing and firing mechanisms..."), the reviewer is not to report any common type munitions fuse as a possible MTCR controlled item unless the fuse in question is of an unusual type, a rough equivalent of which is not likely to be found in most foreign arsenals, or unless the fuse uses sophisticated means (e.g., radar) to determine burst height.

   C3.7.1.1.2. The reviewer transmits a list of the MTCR-controlled items to the IA MTCR point of contact (POC) at the earliest opportunity to ensure minimal delays in the LOA processing time. This list includes: the case identifier; a general case description identifying major associated systems; the Military Articles and Services List (MASL) number of each MTCR-controlled item; the MTCR Annex Category and item identifier, the nomenclature of each item; and a detailed description of each item including the manufacturer.

   C3.7.1.1.3. The IA MTCR POC should proceed with case development concurrently with MTEC working group review and assume approval from MTEC working group for the case, unless State PM contacts the IA following the LOR. For Congressional Notification (CN) packages including Category I UAS, DSCA is not required to solicit MTEC approval prior to sending the final CN package to PM/RSAT. Per the AECA, MILDEPS are still required to identify MTCR related articles in transmittal records for Congressional Notification purposes. MTEC approval is required prior to LOA offer. verifies the list and submits an approval request to the Office of Missile, Biological, and Chemical Nonproliferation (MBC), Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN), Department of State with carbon copy to DSCA (Office of International Operations, Weapons Directorate (IOPS/WPN)), as appropriate. The IA MTCR POC will ensure DSCA (IOPS/WPN) is provided a copy of the ISN/MBC response to the approval request. The IA also will include the approval request in the electronic package (ePKG) uploaded into the Case Tracking System (CTS).

   C3.7.2. Missile Technology Control Regime Category I Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Unmanned Aerial Vehicles/Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle. Below list is not inclusive.

   • RQ-1/MQ-1 Predator
   • MQ-9 Reaper
   • RQ-4 Global Hawk
   • MQ-4C TritonSky Warrior
   • North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Alliance Ground Surveillance (NATO AGS)

   C3.7.2.1. USG policy stipulates a "strong presumption to deny" the transfer of MTCR Category I Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) UAVs/Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs). If the U.S. Military Group (MILGP) becomes aware that the host country is considering submission of an LOR for an MTCR Category I ISR UAV or UCAV prior to development and submission of an LOR for such a system, the MILGP should initiate a requirements analysis and pre-screening. This process begins with a assessment by the MILGP providing all elements of information in Table C3.T5. below. In the preparation of the assessment, the MILGP should consult and confer with the IAs, including the IA's Foreign Disclosure Office; the Country Team; and the Combatant Command (CCMD). When complete, the MILGP's assessment will be forwarded to the CCMD for comment on each of elements 1-17 addressed in the assessment in a subsequent CCMD Comment. The MILGP assessment and the CCMD Comment should be forwarded to the Joint Staff/J5 and DSCA. This process forms the basis for a collaborative effort, to analyze the recipient nation's military requirements in order to identify a platform/payload combination (manned aircraft, Cat II UAV/UCAV, or Cat I UAV/UCAV) that fulfills those requirements and complies with the MTCR and other USG security requirements. If the MILGP is not able to develop the MILGP assessment in advance of submission of an LOR for an MTCR Category I ISR UAV or UCAV, MILGP assessment required information should be submitted as part of the Country Team Assessment (CTA). See Table C5.T1B.

2. Remove Table C3.T5. and renumber tables in Chapter 3 as required.

   Table C3.T5. Missile Technology Control Regime Category I Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Unmanned Aerial Vehicles or Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle Security Cooperation Organization Assessment

   #	Required Information
   1	What are the military requirements and operational intentions or plans for the ISR UAV/UCAV that might be requested, to include: Description of the primary mission and secondary missions for the ISR UAV/UCAV? Extent of anti-terrorist, border patrol/coast guard, and/or humanitarian missions for the UAV/UCAV(s) endorsed.
   2	Specify performance characteristics of the desired air vehicle in terms of range (kilometer (km), payload (kilogram (kg), payload performance parameters or desired capabilities, altitude ceiling (feet (ft), flight endurance (hrs)). Are there any desired modifications or changes to the basic configuration for the desired air vehicle or payload?
   3	How the ISR UAV or UCAV would affect the military capabilities of the proposed recipient, including the ability of the recipient effectively to field, support, and appropriately employ the system in accordance with its intended end use.
   4	How the ISR UAV or UCAV would contribute to U.S. strategic and foreign policy goals.
   5	Justification for number and type of ISR UAV/UCAV that might be requested with an explanation of how the quantity endorsed is the minimum required consistent with the legitimate military requirements of the recipient. What is the estimated or approximate monthly number of sorties and flight hours? Where will the ISR UAV/UCAVs be based?
   6	What are the communications resources that the recipient nation would utilize to support its ISR UAV/UCAV flight operations? Does the recipient nation require beyond line-of-sight flight operations? Will air-ground communications and/or data transfer require encryption?
   7	If applicable, would the ISR UAV/UCAV fulfill or contribute to NATO force goals?
   8	Explain why an MTCR Category I ISR UAV or UCAV would fulfill the requirements and a manned aircraft or non-MTCR Category 1 ISR UAV or UCAV cannot.
   9	Is this the first introduction of this system/capability to the recipient/region?
   10	Anticipated reactions of neighboring nations to the introduction of the ISR UAV/UCAV capability into the region.
   11	Analysis of how the proposed sale would affect the relative military strengths of countries in the region and of the impact of the proposed sale on U.S. relations with the countries in the region.
   12	Extent of military interoperability missions/training with U.S. forces?
   13	The availability of comparable systems from foreign suppliers.
   14	Assessment of the nation's ability to account for, safeguard, operate, maintain, and support the ISR UAV or UCAV. What is the nation's maintenance concept? Two level? Three level? Does the nation expect it will provide depot level repair or will it elect contractor provided depot level maintenance? What level of repairable stocks does the nation anticipate it will require?
   15	A plan for end use monitoring for sensitive and advanced war fighting technology and the MILGP's plan for compliance verification.
   16	Training required either in-country or in the United States and anticipated reactions resulting from the presence of U.S. trainers in-country. How many pilots, sensor operators, and maintainers will it need to be trained either in-country or in the United States? Approximately when, if elected, the nation needs to commence/end U.S.-based training? Will the nation need in-country flight simulators? If so, how many? Will the nation need to participate in related U.S. Air Force (USAF)/U.S. Navy (USN) UAV user-groups, forums, or other USAF/USN programs concurrent with adopting a U.S. UAV.
   17	Possible impact of any in-country U.S. presence that might be required as a result of providing the ISR UAV or UCAV..
   18	Is the potential recipient a: Member of NATO? MTCR Partner? Signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty? Signatory to the Chemical Warfare Convention? Signatory to the Biological Weapons Convention?
   19	Has the MILGP consulted with the Foreign Disclosure Office of the FMS IA regarding the need for disclosure of information actions in regard to a potential transfer of a Category I ISR UAV/UCAV?
   20	Any additional information in support of, or that would recommend against, the transfer request.

3. Update Table C5.T1A. as follows:

   Table C5.T1A. Defense Articles that Require Additional Country Team Assessment Elements

   #	Required Element
   1	Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Category I Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)/Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle (UCAV) (if information has not already been submitted before the LOR per Section C3.7.2. If a CTA was submitted in the pre-LOR phase, it may be referenced without submission of a new CTA.) Table C5.T1B.
   21	Command, Control, Communications, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) Table C5.T1CB.
   32	Defense Articles and Services Containing Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) Table C5.T1DC.
   42	Night Vision Devices (NVDs) Table C5.T1ED.
   54	STINGER or Similar Missiles in any Surface-to-Air (S/A) Configuration Table C5.T1FE.
   65	White Phosphorous Munitions Table C5.T1GF.
   76	Air-to-Ground (A/G) and Indirect fire surface-to-surface (S/S) munitions, their delivery systems. Table C5.T1HG.

4. Remove Table C5.T1B.

   Table C5.T1B. Additional Country Team Assessment Elements for Missile Technology Control Regime Category 1 Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Unmanned Aerial Vehicles/Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles
   _{(If information has not already been submitted before the LOR per Section C3.7.2. If a CTA was submitted in the pre-LOR phase, it may be referenced without submission of a new CTA.)}

   #	Required Element
   13	What are the military requirements and operational intentions or plans for the ISR UAV/UCAV that might be requested, to include: Description of the primary mission and secondary missions for the ISR UAV/UCAV? Extent of anti-terrorist, border patrol/ coast guard, and/or humanitarian missions for the UAV/UCAV(s) endorsed.
   14	Specify performance characteristics of the desired air vehicle in terms of range (km), payload (kg), payload performance parameters or desired capabilities, altitude ceiling (ft), flight endurance (hrs). Are there any desired modifications or changes to the basic configuration for the desired air vehicle or payload?
   15	How the ISR UAV or UCAV would affect the military capabilities of the proposed recipient, including the ability of the recipient effectively to field, support, and appropriately employ the system in accordance with its intended end use.
   16	How the ISR UAV or UCAV would contribute to U.S. strategic and foreign policy goals.
   17	Justification for number and type of ISR UAV/UCAV that might be requested with an explanation of how the quantity endorsed is the minimum required consistent with the legitimate military requirements of the recipient. What is the estimated or approximate monthly number of sorties and flight hours? Where will the ISR UAV/UCAVs be based?
   18	What are the communications resources that the recipient nation would utilize to support its ISR UAV/UCAV flight operations? Does the recipient nation require beyond line-of-sight flight operations? Will air-ground communications and/or data transfer require encryption?
   19	If applicable, would the ISR UAV/UCAV fulfill or contribute to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) force goals?
   20	Explain why an MTCR Category I ISR UAV or UCAV would fulfill the requirements and a manned aircraft or non-MTCR Category I ISR UAV or UCAV cannot.
   21	Is this the first introduction of this system/capability to the recipient/region?
   22	Anticipated reactions of neighboring nations to the introduction of the ISR UAV/UCAV capability into the region.
   23	Analysis of how the proposed sale would affect the relative military strengths of countries in the region and of the impact of the proposed sale on U.S. relations with the countries in the region.
   24	Extent of military interoperability missions/training with U.S. Forces?
   25	The availability of comparable systems from foreign suppliers.
   26	Assessment of the nation's ability to account for, safeguard, operate, maintain, and support the ISR UAV or UCAV. What is the nation's maintenance concept? Two level? Three level? Does the nation expect it will provide depot level repair or will it elect contractor provided depot level maintenance? What level of repairable stocks does the nation anticipate it will require?
   27	A plan for end use monitoring for sensitive and advanced war fighting technology and the MILGP's plan for compliance verification.
   28	Training required either in-country or in the United States and anticipated reactions resulting from the presence of U.S. trainers in-country. How many pilots, sensor operators, and maintainers will it need to be trained either in-country or in the United States? Approximately when the nation needs to commence/end any desired U.S.-based training? Will the nation need in-country flight simulators? If so, how many? Will the nation need to participate in related U.S. Air Force (USAF)/U.S. Navy (USN) UAV user-groups, forums, or other USAF/USN programs concurrent with adopting a U.S. UAV?
   29	Possible impact of any in-country U.S. presence that might be required as a result of providing the ISR UAV or UCAV.
   30	Is the potential recipient a: Member of NATO? MTCR Partner? Signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty? Signatory to the Chemical Warfare Convention? Signatory to the Biological Weapons Convention?
   31	Has the MILGP consulted with the Foreign Disclosure Office of the FMS IA regarding the need for disclosure of information actions in regard to a potential transfer of a Category I ISR UAV/UCAV? Yes/No
   32	Any additional information in support of, or that would recommend against, the transfer request.

5. Renumber the following Chapter 5 tables as shown:

   Existing	Revised
   Table C5.T1C. Additional Country Team Assessment Elements for Command, Control, Communications, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance	Table C5.T1B. ....
   Table C5.T1D. Additional Country Team Assessment Elements for Geospatial Intelligence	Table C5.T1C. ....
   Table C5.T1E. Additional Country Team Assessment Elements for Night Vision Devices	Table C5.T1D. ....
   Table C5.T1F. Additional Country Team Assessment Elements for STINGER or Similar Missile in any Surface-to-Air Configuration	Table C5.T1E. ....
   Table C5.T1G. Additional Country Team Assessment Elements for White Phosphorous Munitions	Table C5.T1F. ....
   Table C5.T1H. Additional Country Team Assessment Elements for Air-to-Surface and Indirect Fire Surface-to-Surface Munitions and their Delivery Systems	Table C5.T1G. ....